This listing includes the 60+ terrorist groups designated by the US State Department as Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTOs), as well as an additional 10 non-designated, self-proclaimed branches and affiliates of the Islamic State of Iraq and ash-Sham (ISIS) FTO. The information provided includes details on each cited group's history, goals, leadership, organization, areas of operation, tactics, weapons, size, and sources of support.
Abdallah Azzam Brigades (AAB)
aka: AAB, Ziyad al-Jarrah Battalions of the Abdallah Azzam Brigades; Yusuf al-‘Uyayri Battalions of the Abdallah Azzam Brigades; Marwan Hadid Brigades; Marwan Hadid Brigade; Abdullah Azzam Brigades in the Land of Al Sham
history: assessed as disbanded; formed around 2005 as a Sunni jihadist group with ties to al-Qa’ida; formally announced its presence in a 2009 video statement while claiming responsibility for a rocket attack against Israel; in 2013, became involved in the Syrian War where it fought against Iranian-backed forces, particularly Hizballah; in 2019 announced that it was disbanding; had been largely dormant for years prior to the announcement
goals: rid the Middle East of Western influence, disrupt Israel's economy and its efforts to establish security, and erode Shia Muslim influence in Lebanon
leadership and organization: Sirajeddin ZURAYQAT (var: Surajuddin Zureiqat, Siraj al-Din Zreqat, Siraj al-Din Zuraiqat) was AAB's spiritual leader, spokesman, and commander; was divided into regionally based branches representing fighters in southern Lebanon (Ziyad al-Jarrah Battalions), the Gaza Strip (Marwan Hadid Brigade), and Syria
areas of operation: was based in Lebanon and operated chiefly in Lebanon; was also active in Gaza and Syria
targets, tactics, and weapons: principal targets were Shia Muslims, the Shia terrorist group Hizballah, and Israel; was responsible for several car and suicide bombing attacks against Shia Muslims in Beirut, Lebanon, including twin suicide bombs that detonated outside the Iranian Embassy in Beirut, Lebanon—killing 22 and injuring at least 140; claimed responsibility for numerous rocket attacks against Israel and Lebanon; members were typically armed with small arms, light machine guns, grenades, rockets, and improvised explosive devices
strength: not available; it was estimated to be down to a few dozen members in 2021
financial and other support: funding support is unknown but probably received donations from sympathizers and engaged in smuggling contraband, including weapons
designation - placed on the US Department of State's list of Foreign Terrorist Organizations on 30 May 2012
Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG)
aka: al-Harakat al Islamiyya (the Islamic Movement); al-Harakat-ul al-Islamiyah; Bearer of the Sword; Father of the Executioner; Father of the Swordsman; International Harakatu'l Al-Islamia; Lucky 9; Islamic State in the Philippines; Mujahideen Commando Freedom Fighters
history: formed in 1991 when it split from the Moro Islamic Liberation Front; has carried out dozens of attacks in the Philippines; linked to al-Qa’ida in the 1990s and 2000s; in recent years, the group has focused on local violence and criminal activity, especially kidnap-for-ransom operations; some factions have declared allegiance to the Islamic State and have had a large role in the operations of ISIS-East Asia (ISIS-EA) in the Philippines, including the attack on Marawi City in 2017; ASG fighters affiliated with ISIS-EA were reportedly linked to suicide attacks in 2019 and 2020 in Jolo, Sulu province; the commander of an ASG faction, Hatib Hajan SAWADJAAN, was the acting leader of ISIS-EA until his reported death in mid-2020; continued to be active in 2023, despite considerable losses in members and leaders to counter-terrorism operations by Philippine security forces
goals: establish an Islamic State in the southern Philippines and ultimately across Southeast Asia
leadership and organization - leadership fragmented; loosely structured and family/clan/network-based; factions tend to coalesce around individual leaders; Sulu-based Radullan SAHIRON (aka Putol, Kahal Mohammad) reportedly became the leader in 2017; SAHIRON has not pledged allegiance to ISIS
areas of operation: the southern Philippines, especially Basilan, Jolo, and Tawi-Tawi islands and their surrounding waters, as well as Mindanao; also has been active in Malaysia
targets, tactics, and weapons - targets military and security personnel, facilities, and checkpoints; also attacks civilian targets, such as churches, markets, and ferry boats; conducted the country’s deadliest terrorist attack when it bombed a ferry boat in Manila Bay in 2004, killing 116 people; two suicide bombers affiliated with both ASG and ISIS-EA killed 23 people and wound more than 100 at a cathedral; known for kidnapping civilians, particularly foreigners, for ransom and has killed hostages when ransoms were not paid; tactics include car bombings, ambushes, complex assaults involving dozens of fighters, beheadings, and assassinations, as well as possible suicide bombings; has conducted acts of piracy in local waters; weapons include small arms, light and heavy machine guns, mortars, landmines, and improvised explosive devices
strength: assessed in 2022 to have less than 200 armed fighters
financial and other support: funded primarily through kidnapping-for-ransom operations and extortion; makes financial appeals on social media; may receive funding from external sources, including remittances from overseas Philippine workers and Middle East-based sympathizers; has received training and other assistance from other regional terrorist groups, such as Jemaah Islamiya; buys weapons and ammunition from corrupt local government officials or smuggles them in from nearby countries
designation: placed on the US Department of State's list of Foreign Terrorist Organizations on 8 October 1997
Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade (AAMB)
aka: al-Aqsa Martyrs Battalion; al-Aqsa Brigades; Martyr Yasser Arafat; Kata'ib Shuhada al-Aqsa; The Brigades; al-Aqsa Intifada Martyrs' Group; Martyrs of al-Aqsa Group
history: emerged at the outset of the second intifada in September 2000 as a loosely-organized armed wing of Yasser ARAFAT's Fatah faction in the West Bank; in 2002, some members splintered from Fatah while others remained loyal; the group carried out suicide attacks against Israeli targets between 2001-2007; most of the group’s leaders have been captured or killed by Israel; following an agreement between Israel and the Palestinian Authority (PA) after the HAMAS takeover of Gaza in 2007, Israel pardoned some AAMB fighters in return for an agreement to disarm; after a trial period, those that disarmed were absorbed into PA security forces while those that refused were targeted by PA security forces; still others formed splinter groups such as the Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades-Nidal al-Amoudi Division and the Popular Resistance Committees in Gaza; some factions participated in operations against Israeli targets through the 2010s, including the “Stabbing Intifada” of 2015-16, as well as periodic rocket attacks in 2017-2018; claimed responsibility for several attacks in 2022 following the killing of some militants by Israeli security forces in 2021; active in 2023
goals: drive the Israeli military and Israeli settlers from the West Bank and establish a Palestinian state loyal to Fatah
leadership and organization: not available; most of the group’s original leaders have been captured or killed by Israel; typically has operated as a collection of loosely organized cells with their own leaders and independent operational agendas, although the group reportedly formed a Joint Operations Room with Katibat Jenin (the Jenin branch of Palestine Islamic Jihad) in the West Bank in early 2022
areas of operation: Israel, Gaza, and the West Bank; has members in Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon
targets, tactics, and weapons: primarily employed bombing and small-arms attacks against Israeli military personnel and settlers after the second intifada began in September 2000, but by 2002 had turned increasingly to attacks against civilians inside Israel, including the first female suicide bombing; since 2010, has launched numerous rocket attacks against Israeli communities; largest attack was in November 2012, when it fired more than 500 rockets into Israel during Israeli military operations in Gaza; fighters typically armed with small arms, light and heavy machine guns, grenades, mortars, improvised explosive devices, and rockets
strength: estimated in 2022 to have a few hundred members
financial and other support: Iran has provided AAMB with funds and guidance, mostly through Hizballah facilitators; has cooperated with other terrorist groups throughout its existence, including Hamas, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), and Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ)
designation –placed on the US Department of State's list of Foreign Terrorist Organizations on 27 March 2002
al-Ashtar Brigades (AAB)
aka - Saraya al-Ashtar; the military arm of the al-Wafa Islamic movement
history: is an Iranian-backed Shia militant group established in 2013 with the aim of overthrowing the ruling Sunni family in Bahrain; in 2018, formally adopted Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps branding in its logo and flag and reaffirmed the group’s loyalty to Tehran; has not claimed any attacks in recent years, but reportedly still active through 2022
goals: foment an insurgency against the ruling Sunni family of Bahrain and, ultimately, replace it with a Shia-based government; also seeks to expel US and other Western military forces from Bahrain
leadership and organization: Qassim Abdullah Ali AHMED (aka Qassim al Muamen) is the Iran-based leader of AAB; operates in cells
areas of operation: located in Bahrain; also active in Iran and Iraq
targets, tactics, and weapons: targets local security forces in Bahrain and has claimed more than 20 attacks, some of which caused casualties; has plotted to attack oil pipelines; also has promoted violence against the British, Saudi Arabian, and US governments; methods include shootings and bombings; equipped with small arms and explosives, including improvised explosive devices
strength: not available
funding and other support: receives funding, training, and weapons support from the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps; has also allied itself with Iranian-backed Iraqi Shia militants and with Lebanese Hizballah for financial and logistic support
designation: placed on the US Department of State's list of Foreign Terrorist Organizations on 11 July 2018
al-Mourabitoun
aka: Al-Murabitun; al-Mulathamun Battalion; al-Mulathamun Brigade; al-Muwaqqi’un bil-Dima; Those Signed in Blood Battalion (or Brigade); Signatories in Blood; Those who Sign in Blood; Witnesses in Blood; Signed-in-Blood Battalion; Masked Men Brigade; Khaled Abu al-Abbas Brigade; al-Mulathamun Masked Ones Brigade; al-Murabitoun; The "Sentinels" or "Guardians"
history: was part of al-Qa’ida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) but split from AQIM in 2012 over leadership disputes; merged with the Mali-based Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa to form al-Murabitoun in August 2013; some members split from the group in mid-2015 and declared allegiance to the Islamic State, which acknowledged the pledge in October 2016, creating the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara; in late 2015, al-Mulathamun/al-Mourabitoun announced a re-merger with AQIM and in 2017, joined a coalition of al-Qa’ida-affiliated groups operating in the Sahel region known as Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM); the group remained active in 2023 under the JNIM banner
goals: replace regional governments with an Islamic state; expel Western influence
leadership and organization: unclear; possibly Hamza Tabankort; operations guided by a governing shura council but details on the sub-structure are not available
areas of operation: most active in Mali; has also operated in Algeria, Burkina Faso, Libya, and Niger
targets, tactics, and weapons: primarily targets Western interests in the Sahel but also regional military forces, including Malian, French (until their withdrawal in 2022), and UN; known for high-profile attacks with small arms and explosives against civilian targets frequented or run by Westerners, including restaurants, hotels, mines, and energy facilities; in 2013, claimed responsibility for taking over 800 people hostage during a four-day siege at the Tiguentourine gas plant in southeastern Algeria, resulting in the deaths of 39 civilians; has claimed responsibility for suicide car bombings at military bases in Niger and Mali, including a suicide car bombing attack on a military camp in Gao, Mali in 2017 that killed at least 60 and wounded more than 100; armed with small arms, machine guns, landmines, mortars, and explosives, including ground and vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices
strength: not available; dated information suggests a few hundred
financial and other support: engages in kidnappings for ransom and smuggling activities; receives support through its connections to other terrorist organizations in the region; acquired weapons from Libya, battlefield captures, and seized stockpiles from local militaries
designation: placed on the US Department of State's list of Foreign Terrorist Organizations on 19 December 2013
al-Qa'ida (AQ)
aka: al-Qa’eda; al-Qaeda; Qa’idat al-Jihad (The Base for Jihad); formerly Qa’idat Ansar Allah (The Base of the Supporters of God); the Islamic Army; Islamic Salvation Foundation; The Base; The Group for the Preservation of the Holy Sites; The Islamic Army for the Liberation of the Holy Places; the World Islamic Front for Jihad Against Jews and Crusaders; the Usama Bin Ladin Network; the Usama Bin Ladin Organization; al-Jihad; the Jihad Group; Egyptian al-Jihad; Egyptian Islamic Jihad; New Jihad
history: formed under Usama BIN LADIN (UBL) circa 1988 and now one of the largest and longest-operating jihadist organizations in the world; helped finance, recruit, transport, and train fighters for the Afghan resistance against the former Soviet Union in the 1980s; in the 1990s, was based in Sudan and then Afghanistan, where it planned and staged attacks; merged with al-Jihad (Egyptian Islamic Jihad) in June 2001; developed a reputation for carrying out large-scale, mass casualty attacks against civilians; has lost dozens of mid- and senior-level operatives to counterterrorism efforts, including UBL in May 2011, which has disrupted operations but the group continues to recruit, plan, inspire, and conduct attacks; has established affiliated organizations in the Middle East, Africa, and Asia, and its contemporary strength is primarily in these affiliates; tied to the Taliban in Afghanistan and remained active there into 2023
goals: eject Western influence from the Islamic world, unite the worldwide Muslim community, overthrow governments perceived as un-Islamic, and ultimately, establish a pan-Islamic caliphate under a strict Salafi Muslim interpretation of sharia; direct, enable, and inspire individuals to conduct attacks, recruit, disseminate propaganda, and raise funds on behalf of the group around the world; destabilize local economies and governments by attacking security services, government targets, and civilian targets; maintain its traditional safe haven in Afghanistan; establish and maintain additional safehavens elsewhere
leadership and organization: Iran-based Sayf al-'Adl reportedly the group's current de facto leader; Ayman al-ZAWAHIRI, who was selected to lead following UBL's death, was killed in 2022; has a leadership council (“majlis al-shura”); al-Qa’ida reportedly maintains branches for military, security, political, religious, financial, and media affairs; affiliates have separate emirs (leaders) and organizational structures that vary by region
areas of operation: based in South Asia (core members in Afghanistan, Iran, Pakistan); employs an affiliate or proxy model, which includes al-Qa’ida in the Arabian Peninsula (Yemen), al-Qa’ida in the Islamic Maghreb (North Africa and the Sahel), Hurras al-Din (Syria), al-Shabaab (Somalia), and al-Qa’ida in the Indian Subcontinent (Afghanistan, Bangladesh, India, and Pakistan); has supporters, sympathizers, and associates worldwide, including in Asia, Europe, North America, and South America; maintains a strong online presence and individuals inspired by AQ’s ideology may conduct operations without direction from its central leadership; opportunistically enters (or secures the allegiance of participants in) local conflicts
targets, tactics, and weapons: considers its enemies to be Shia Muslims, US and Western interests, so-called "apostate" governments (such as Saudi Arabia) perceived to be supporting the US and the West, and the Islamic State; leader ZAWAHIRI has encouraged followers to attack European (particularly British and French), Israeli, NATO, Russian, and US targets, specifically military bases and forces; targets have included embassies, restaurants, hotels, airplanes, trains, and tourists sites; employs a combination of guerrilla warfare hit-and-run and terrorist tactics against security and military forces; known for use of suicide bombers, car bombs, explosive-laden boats, and airplanes; conducted the September 11, 2001 attacks on the US, which involved 19 operatives hijacking and crashing four US commercial jets—two into the World Trade Center in New York City, one into the Pentagon, and the last into a field in Shanksville, Pennsylvania—killing nearly 3,000 people
strength: as of 2023, it was estimated to have about 400 fighters in Afghanistan; the organization remained a focal point of inspiration for a worldwide network of affiliated groups and other sympathetic terrorist organizations, such as the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, Islamic Jihad Union, Lashkar i Jhangvi, Harakat ul-Mujahideen, the Haqqani Network, and Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan
financial and other support –primarily depends on donations from like-minded supporters and from individuals, primarily in the Gulf States; uses social media platforms to solicit donations and has been channeled funds through cyberfinancing campaigns; has received some funds from kidnapping for ransom operations; historically has acquired money from Islamic charitable organizations; also recruits followers through social media
designation: placed on the US Department of State's list of Foreign Terrorist Organizations on 8 October 1999
note - has some ideological and tactical similarities with the Islamic State of Iraq and ash-Sham (ISIS) and the groups typically operate in the same conflict zones, but the relationship is mostly adversarial, and they compete for resources and recruits, and often clash militarily
al-Qa'ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)
aka: al-Qa’ida in the South Arabian Peninsula; al-Qa’ida in Yemen; al-Qa’ida of Jihad Organization in the Arabian Peninsula; al-Qa’ida Organization in the Arabian Peninsula; Tanzim Qa’idat al-Jihad fi Jazirat al-Arab; AQY; Ansar al-Shari’a; Sons of Abyan; Sons of Hadramawt; Sons of Hadramawt Committee; Civil Council of Hadramawt; National Hadramawt Council
history: formed in January 2009 when the now-deceased leader of al-Qa’ida (AQ) in Yemen, Nasir AL-WAHISHI, publicly announced that Yemeni and Saudi al-Qa’ida operatives were working together under the banner of AQAP; the announcement signaled the rebirth of an AQ franchise that previously carried out attacks in Saudi Arabia; beginning in 2014-2015, AQAP was able to take advantage of Yemen’s civil war and expand operations in the country, controlling a large portion of the southern part of the Yemen by 2016; after 2017, the group began losing territory, fighters, and leaders to internal dissensions, desertions to ISIS, and casualties from clashes with Yemeni and international security forces, the Houthis, and ISIS; nevertheless, as of 2023 the group continued to persist as a local and regional threat
goals: establish a caliphate and a government/society based on sharia in the Arabian Peninsula and the wider Middle East; support the broader goals of AQ’s central leadership
leadership and organization: led by Khalid bin Umar BA TARFI (aka Abu Miqdad al-Kindi); has a leadership council (“majlis al-shura”) comprised of lieutenant commanders who are responsible for overall political direction and military operations; organized in branches or wings for military operations, political, propaganda (recruitment), religious issues (for justifying attacks from a theological perspective while offering spiritual guidance), and security; typically operates in a decentralized manner that allows individual cells to operate independently
areas of operation: most active in central Yemen; probably has a limited presence in Saudi Arabia
targets, tactics, and weapons: chiefly targets Security Belt Forces and other groups affiliated with the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia in the Shabwa and Abyan governorates, as well as the Houthis in the Bayda governorate; also targets Yemeni Government officials, oil facilities, merchant ships, and Shia Muslims; has targeted Western interests, including embassies, diplomats, business people, tourists, and both commercial airliners; claimed the small arms attack in Feb 2020 that resulted in the deaths of three US military personnel in Florida, as well as an attack in Paris in 2015 that killed 12 civilians at the office of a magazine publisher; has waged open warfare with Islamic State elements in Yemen since 2018; employs guerrilla-style and terrorist tactics, including ambushes, complex assaults, assassinations, snipers, bombings, and suicide attacks; equipped with small arms, machine guns, artillery, rockets, landmines, anti-tank missiles, armored combat vehicles, man-portable air defense systems (MANPADs), armed unmanned aerial vehicles (drones), and improvised explosive devices, including car bombs, road side bombs, and suicide vests
strength: estimated in 2023 to have up to 3,000 fighters, down from as many as 7,000 in 2018
financial and other support: receives funding from theft, robberies, oil and gas revenue, kidnapping-for-ransom operations, and donations from like-minded supporters; for nearly a year after seizing the city of Mukallah in April 2015, had access millions of dollars from port fees and funds stolen from the central bank; many of its weapons have been seized from the Yemeni military; recruits through social media, print, and digital means
designation: placed on the US Department of State's list of Foreign Terrorist Organizations on 19 January 2010
al-Qa'ida in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS)
aka: al-Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent; Qaedat al-Jihad in the Indian Subcontinent, Qaedat al-Jihad, Jamaat Qaidat al-Jihad fi'shibhi al-Qarrat al-Hindiya,
history: al-Qa'ida leader Dr. Ayman al-ZAWAHIRI announced AQIS's inception in a video address in September 2014; the group claimed responsibility for a September 2014 attack on a naval dockyard in Karachi in an attempt to seize a Pakistani warship; since the assault, the group has conducted a limited number of small attacks on civilians, but has not publicly claimed any attacks since 2017, although some members fought in Afghanistan with the Taliban; suffered some losses to counter-terrorism operations in 2020-2022; in September and October 2021, the group released two propaganda videos specifically targeting India and Kashmir, and in mid-2022 threatened to conduct suicide bombings in several Indian cities; has strong ties to Lashkare Tayyiba (LeT) and a rivalry with the Islamic State's Khorasan branch
goals: establish an Islamic caliphate in the Indian subcontinent; support the broader goals of al-Qai’da’s central leadership
leadership and organization: Usama MAHMOOD (alt. Osama MEHMOOD); has a shura council, which, like other AQ affiliates, probably includes subordinates and branches/wings for military/security, intelligence, religious, propaganda, political matters, and recruitment; reportedly has regional branches for Bangladesh, India, and Pakistan; Ansar al-Islam in Bangladesh has claimed to be the official wing of AQIS in Bangladesh
areas of operation: Afghanistan, Bangladesh, India, Pakistan, and possibly Burma
targets, tactics, and weapons: military and security personnel, political parties, foreigners, foreign aid workers, university professors, students, and secular bloggers; has used small arms and improvised explosive devices, as well as crude weapons such as machetes; claimed responsibility for the 2016 machete murders of two editors of a human rights magazine in Dhaka, Bangladesh
membership: estimated in 2022 to have up to 400 fighters
financial and other support: likely receives financial and material support from AQ senior leadership; also engages in kidnapping-for-ransom, extortion, and general criminal activity to raise funds
designation: placed on the US Department of State's list of Foreign Terrorist Organizations on 1 July 2016
al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM)
aka: GSPC; Le Groupe Salafiste Pour la Predication et le Combat; Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat; Salafist Group for Call and Combat; Tanzim al-Qa’ida fi Bilad alMaghrib al-Islamiya
history: formed in 1998 in Algeria under Hassan HATTAB, when he split from the Armed Islamic Group (GIA); was known as the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC) until rebranding itself as AQIM in September 2006; has since undergone various schisms and rapprochements; in 2011, a Mauritanian-led group broke away, calling itself the Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJWA); in 2012, the Veiled Men Battalion split off and rebranded itself the al-Mulathamun Battalion; al-Mulathamun and MUJWA merged to form al-Mourabitoun in 2013; in late 2015, AQIM reincorporated al-Murabitoun and in 2017, the Mali Branch of AQIM and al-Murabitoun joined the Mali-based al-Qa’ida coalition Jama‘at Nasr al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM); continued to be active in 2023 despite heavy pressure from regional and international counterterrorism operations, particularly in using North Africa as a support zone for assisting JNIM operations in Mali and the Sahel, including operating transnational financial networks to move and share funds
goals: overthrow “apostate” African regimes and establish a regional Islamic state across all of North and West Africa; support the broader goals of al-Qai’da’s central leadership
leadership and organization: Abu Obaida al-ANNABI (aka Abu Ubaydah Yusuf al-Anabi, Yazid Mubarak); has a 14-member shura council comprised of regional commanders and the heads of the political, military, judicial, and media committees; locally organized into "battalions" and "brigades," which range in size from a few dozen to several hundred fighters at any given time
areas of operation: has historically operated in the coastal areas of northern Algeria and in Libya and Tunisia, but counterterrorism efforts have forced it largely into the Sahel region, including Mali; has conducted attacks in Algeria, Burkina Faso, Cote d'Ivoire, and Mali
targets, tactics, and weapons: local and international military and security forces using both terrorist and guerrilla warfare tactics; employs improvised explosive devices, suicide bombers, as well as light weapons, machine guns, mortars, rockets, and landmines; also attacks “soft” civilian targets such as hotels, resorts, and restaurants that cater to Westerners and tourists with small arms, explosives and suicide bombers; known for assassinations and kidnappings
strength: estimated in 2022 to have up to 1,000 fighters
financial and other support: engages in kidnappings-for-ransom and other criminal activities, particularly extorting drug trafficking groups and others; arms largely acquired from Libyan stockpiles, battlefield captures, or via illicit regional arms markets
designation: GSPC was designated as a Foreign Terrorist Organization on 27 March 2002; the Department of State amended the GSPC designation on 20 February 2008, after the GSPC officially joined with al-Qa’ida in September 2006 and became AQIM
al-Shabaab (AS)
aka: the Harakat Shabaab al-Mujahidin (HSM); al-Shabab; Shabaab; the Youth; Mujahidin al-Shabaab Movement; Mujahideen Youth Movement; Mujahidin Youth Movement; al-Hijra, Al Hijra, Muslim Youth Center, MYC, Pumwani Muslim Youth, Pumwani Islamist Muslim Youth Center
history: descended from Al-Ittihad Al-Islami, a Somali terrorist group whose leaders fought in Afghanistan in the 1990s and formed circa 2003; has operated as a core al-Qa'ida affiliate since 2012; was the militant wing of the former Somali Islamic Courts Council that took over parts of Somalia in 2006; since the end of 2006, has engaged in an insurgency against the transitional governments of Somalia and supporting foreign military forces and a campaign of violence against Somali civilians; responsible for numerous high-profile bombings and shootings throughout Somalia, and more than 3,000 civilian deaths since 2015; has influence in large areas of rural Somalia through coercion, control over local economies and commercial transit points; provides rudimentary government services in areas under its control, including rule of law through sharia courts, sharia-based institutions and schools, funding, services, security, and food; in 2019, was involved in more than 1,000 violent incidents in Somalia and eastern Kenya; in July 2022, it launched an incursion into Ethiopia with several hundred fighters; continued to conduct attacks in Somalia into 2023, particularly in the central and southern regions, as well as the capital, Mogadishu; also was engaged in heavy fighting with the Somali military, which claimed to have re-taken considerable amounts of territory from the group; the Somali military offensive continued into 2023
goals: discredit, destabilize, and overthrow the Federal Government of Somalia; establish Islamic rule in Somalia and the border regions of Somalia-Kenya and southern Ethiopia; drive out Western influence
leadership and organization: led by Ahmad DIRIYE (aka Abu UBEYDAH/UBAIDAH, Abu Ubaidah DIREYE, Ahmad UMAR) since September 2014; structure is both hierarchical and decentralized and influenced by Somalia’s many clans; DIRIYE reportedly directs both an executive council and a shura (or consultative) council; the executive council runs the group's operations and is made up of committees, ministries, departments, or wings, including for finance, intelligence and security (Amniyat), media/propaganda, politics, education, judicial matters, religion, logistics, explosives (Sanaaca), and military operations (Jabhat), as well as regional commanders/shadow governors in areas that al-Shabaab controls; military operations reportedly includes two sub-branches, one for external operations, and one that enforces sharia in areas under the group's control; the council oversees regional commanders, although regional commanders can make decisions and take actions without the approval of the emir or the council; each regional division has sub-offices or wings, including for police/security and taxation; has shown the ability to mobilize and coordinate significant numbers of fighters for large-scale ground attacks
areas of operation: controls a large swathe of the Lower and Middle Juba regions, as well as the Bakol, Bay, Benaadir, Gedo, and Shabelle regions; also maintains a presence in northern Somalia along the Golis Mountains and within Puntland’s urban areas; has conducted attacks in Djibouti, Kenya, and Uganda; especially active in the region of Kenya adjacent to Somalia; has also mounted armed incursions into Ethiopia in 2022 and 2007 (planned attacks inside Ethiopia were reportedly disrupted in 2013 and 2014)
targets, tactics, and weapons: Somali Government officials, military units, police, and civilians, international aid workers, journalists, foreign troops (including US, African Union), and neighboring countries contributing to military stabilization operations in Somalia, particularly Kenya and Uganda; has attacked hotels, schools, military bases, police stations, shopping areas, and telecommunications towers in Kenya; has clashed with an Islamic State faction operating in northern Somalia; methods include assassinations, drive-by shootings, guerrilla style ambushes, suicide bombings, hostage taking, indiscriminate attacks on civilians, and roadside IEDs; typical attacks consist of a single or multiple suicide bombers, followed by an assault by members carrying small arms and explosives; in 2022 and 2023, for example, it conducted two complex ground assaults involving vehicle-mounted bombs and hundreds of militants on international military peacekeeper bases that killed more than 50 troops in each incident; in March 2019, operatives attacked a hotel in Mogadishu using a suicide bomber and small arms, killing at least 20; has placed vehicle-mounted bombs in high-density urban areas, including attacks in Mogadishu in October 2022, December 2019, and October 2017 that together killed over 700 civilians; employs insurgent-type tactics against Somali and international military forces, including ambushes, hit-and-run attacks, improvised explosive device operations, land mines, mortar attacks, and targeted killings; typically armed with small arms, light and heavy machine guns (including truck-mounted machine guns), mortars, rocket-propelled grenades, improvised explosive devices, man-portable air defense systems, and unmanned aerial vehicles/drones
strength: estimated in 2023 to have 7,000 to 12,000 fighters
financial and other support: obtains funds primarily through extortion of businesses, taxation, and zakat (religious donations) collections from the local populations, robbery, and remittances and other money transfers from the Somali diaspora (although these funds are not always intended to support al-Shabaab members); estimated that the group generates $100-$150 million annually from its taxation of all aspects of the Somali economy; probably receives training, arms, and bomb-making materials from other al-Qa’ida branches; operates military training camps in areas it occupies; has captured arms, ammunition, and other materiel from regional and Somali military forces; also purchases arms and ammunition through black markets
designation: placed on the US Department of State's list of Foreign Terrorist Organizations on 18 March 2008
Ansar al-Dine (AAD)
aka: Ansar Dine; Ansar al-Din; Ancar Dine; Ansar ul-Din; Ansar Eddine; Defenders of the Faith
history: formed in November 2011 as a Tuareg rebel group under Iyad Ag Ghali and in mid-2012 began an association with al-Qai'da in the Islamic Maghrib (AQIM), in part because of their shared desire to implement sharia law in Mali; was among the terrorist groups to take over northern Mali following the March 2012 coup that toppled the Malian Government; proceeded to destroy UNESCO World Heritage sites and enforce a severe interpretation of Islam upon the civilian population living in the areas under their control; beginning in 2013, French and African military forces forced AAD and its allies out of the population centers they had seized, severely weakening AAD, although the group made a comeback in 2015 and 2016; in 2017, joined Jama'ah Nusrah al-Islam wal-Muslimin (Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims, JNIM), a coalition of al-Qa'ida-linked groups in Mali that formed the same year; continued to conduct attacks under the JNIM banner into 2023
goals: replace the Malian government with an Islamic state
leadership and organization: led by its founder Iyad Ag GHALI (aka Abu al-FADEL), who also leads JNIM; reportedly has regionally based branches
areas of operation: operates mostly in central and northern Mali
targets, tactics, and weapons: targets Malian military and security forces and UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) personnel; also targeted French military troops prior to their departure in 2022; uses a mix of insurgent/guerrilla warfare hit-and-run and terrorist tactics, including ambushes, complex ground assaults involving dozens of fighters, road side bombs, rocket attacks, assassinations, kidnappings, and car and suicide bombings; fighters are armed with small arms, light and heavy machine guns, rocket-propelled grenades, landmines, mortars, rockets, trucks mounting machine guns (aka “technicals”), and explosives, including improvised explosive devices
strength: not available
financial and other support: cooperates with and has received support from al-Qa’ida since its inception; also reportedly receives funds from foreign donors and through smuggling; many of its arms were captured from the Malian Army or taken from Libyan military stockpiles; takes advantage of trans-Saharan smuggling routes to resupply from illicit markets in Libya and elsewhere in the region
designation - placed on the US Department of State's list of Foreign Terrorist Organizations on 22 March 2013
Ansar al-Islam (AAI)
aka: Ansar al-Sunna; Ansar al-Sunna Army; Devotees of Islam; Followers of Islam in Kurdistan; Helpers of Islam; Jaish Ansar al-Sunna; Jund al-Islam; Kurdish Taliban; Kurdistan Supporters of Islam; Partisans of Islam; Soldiers of God; Soldiers of Islam; Supporters of Islam in Kurdistan
history: founded in December 2001 with support from al-Qa’ida; originated in the Iraqi Kurdistan region with the merger of two Kurdish terrorist factions, Jund al-Islam and a splinter group of the Islamic Movement of Kurdistan; from 2003 to 2011, conducted attacks against a wide range of targets in Iraq, including government and security forces, as well as US and Coalition troops; in the summer of 2014, a faction of AAI pledged allegiance to ISIS and the two factions reportedly have fought each other; after 2014, most activity has been in Syria where AAI has fought against Syrian regime forces, although it claimed a bombing attack against members of a Shia militia in Iraq in late 2019; active in Syria in 2023
goals: expel Western interests from Iraq and, ultimately, establish an Iraqi state operating according to its interpretation of sharia; similar goals in Syria
leadership and organization: led by Amir Shaykh Abu Hashim Muhammad bin Abdul Rahman al-IBRAHIM; likely has a cell-based structure
areas of operation: active in central and western Iraq and in Syria (leadership assessed to be in Syria)
targets, tactics, and weapons: historically targeted Iraqi security and police forces, citizens, politicians, and Shia militia forces for assassinations, bombings, and executions; targets Syrian government forces and pro-Syrian regime militias with guerrilla-style hit-and-run assaults and terrorist attacks; equipped with small arms, light and heavy machine guns, rocket-propelled grenades, mortars, and explosives, including improvised explosive devices
strength: estimated 250-300 fighters
financial and other support: receives assistance from a loose network of associates in Europe and the Middle East
designation: placed on the US Department of State's list of Foreign Terrorist Organizations on 22 March 2004
Ansar al-Shari'a groups in Libya (ASL)
aka: Ansar al-Shari'a in Benghazi; Ansar al-Sharia in Darnah; Ansar al-Shariah Brigade; Ansar al-Shari’a Brigade; Katibat Ansar al-Sharia in Benghazi; Ansar al-Shariah-Benghazi; Al-Raya Establishment for Media Production; Ansar al-Sharia; Soldiers of the Sharia; Ansar al-Shariah; Supporters of Islamic Law; Partisans of Islamic Law; Supporters of Islamic Law in Darnah, Ansar al-Sharia Brigade in Darnah; Ansar al-Sharia in Derna
history: consists of Ansar al-Shari'a in Benghazi (AAS-B) and Ansar al-Sharia in Darnah (AAS-D); AAS-B and AAS-D were formed in 2011 following the fall of the QADHAFI regime as Sunni Muslim Salafist armed groups with links to al-Qa’ida; at their peak in 2013, held territory and operated branches in Benghazi, Darnah, Sirte, Ajdabiya, and Nawfalia; promoted charitable work to gain popular support from local communities; in 2014, began fighting against the Libyan National Army (LNA) under General HIFTER and the Islamic State in Libya (ISIS-Libya) and by 2015 had lost most of their territory and suffered heavy losses; in May 2017, AAS-B announced its dissolution due to battle losses, as well as defections to ISIS-Libya; AAS-D's status in 2022 was unclear
goals: a strict implementation of sharia in Libya
leadership and organization: unknown; AAS-B’s last known emir (leader) was Abu Khalid al-MADANI; the last known emir of AAS-D was founder Abu Sufian Ibrahim Ahmed Hamuda Bin QUMU who defected to ISIS in 2014; organizations are also unknown, but AAS-B reportedly had two main divisions, one dedicated to military affairs and one to charitable work
areas of operation: operated mostly in eastern Libya, particularly Benghazi and Darnah
targets, tactics, and weapons: targets Libyan political and security officials and Westerners for kidnappings, executions, bombings, and assassinations; AAS-B participated in the 2012 attacks on US diplomatic facilities in Benghazi, for example; also conducted guerrilla warfare hit-and-run and terrorist attacks against Libyan security forces, LNA militias, and other terrorist groups using small arms and light weapons, rockets, mortars, anti-tank guided missiles, anti-aircraft artillery and missiles, improvised explosive devices and suicide bombings
strength: not available
financial and other support: obtained funds from al-Qa’ida in the Islamic Maghreb, witting and unwitting Islamic charities, donations from sympathizers, and criminal activities; raided Libyan military bases for weapons and ammunition
designation: AAS-B and AAS-D were placed on the US Department of State's list of Foreign Terrorist Organizations on 13 January 2014
Ansar al-Shari'a in Tunisia (AAS-T)aka: Al-Qayrawan Media Foundation; Supporters of Islamic Law; Ansar al-Sharia in Tunisia; Ansar al-Shari’ah; Ansar al-Shari’ah in Tunisia; Ansar al-Sharia
history: formed in April 2011 as a Sunni Salafi-jihadist militant organization linked to al-Qa'ida; combined community service, proselytization, and violence to promote its ideology and goals; in 2014, multiple AAS-T leaders swore loyalty to the Islamic State and many left the group to fight in Syria; has not claimed any attacks in recent years, and its status is unclear
goals: expand its influence in Tunisia and, ultimately, replace the Tunisian Government with one operating according to Islamic law
leadership and organization: leadership unclear; was reportedly a decentralized movement that gave considerable autonomy to local groups or cells and loosely organized into northern, central, and southern branches; included a media wing known as al-Bayariq Media (The Banners Media)
areas of operation: headquartered in Tunisia; has also operated in Libya
targets, tactics, and weapons: attacked Tunisian military and security personnel with small arms and rocket-propelled grenades; also targeted Tunisian politicians, religious sites, and groups and places representing Western influence, such as tourists and tourist sites, with assassinations and bombings; organized riots and violent demonstrations against the Tunisian government; members are typically armed with small arms and other light weapons, as well as explosives, including improvised explosive devices
strength: not available
financial and other support: precise sources of financial support are not available but believed to come from Tunisian charities, private donors, and smuggling contraband
designation - placed on the US Department of State's list of Foreign Terrorist Organizations on 13 January 2014
Army of Islam (AOI)
aka: Jaysh al-Islam; Jaish al-Islam; JAI
history - formed around 2005 as a Salafi Sunni Muslim splinter from HAMAS; subscribes to Salafist ideology of global jihad blended with the traditional model of armed Palestinian resistance; traditionally focused on attacking Israel and Egypt; in September 2015, pledged allegiance to the Islamic State and declared itself part of the Islamic State’s Sinai Province (IS-SP); has not claimed responsibility for any attacks in recent years, but was active as of 2022
goals: establish a regional Islamic emirate
leadership and organization: led by Mumtaz DUGHMUSH; group organization not available
areas of operation: Egypt, Gaza, Israel
targets, tactics, and weapons: targets the Egyptian and Israeli governments and their citizens; has attacked American, British, and New Zealand citizens; has a history of conducting rocket attacks against Israel, kidnapping civilians, and attacking Christians; conducted a bombing attack on a Coptic Christian church in Egypt in 2011 that killed 25 and wounded 100, probably has conducted joint attacks with IS-SP against Egyptian security service personnel; equipped with small arms, bombs, light and heavy machine guns, mortars, rockets, and improvised explosives devices
strength: estimated in 2022 to number a few hundred fighters
financial and other support: generates funding through criminal activities conducted primarily in Gaza, including kidnappings for ransom; also receives funds from foreign sympathizers and organizations
designation: placed on the US Department of State's list of Foreign Terrorist Organizations on 19 May 2011
Asa’ib Ahl al-Haqq (AAH)
aka: Ahl al-Kahf; Band of the Righteous; Bands of Right; Islamic Shia Resistance in Iraq; Khazali Faction/Network; Khazali Special Groups Network; League of Righteousness
history: is an Iraqi Shia militia and political group that split off from Jaysh al-Mahdi in 2006; fought US military forces in Iraq from 2006 until the US withdrawal in 2011 and has continued attack planning against US and coalition interests following Operation Iraqi Freedom; following the rise of the Islamic State of Iraq and ash-Sham (ISIS) in 2013, fought alongside the Iraqi military as part of the Popular Mobilization Committee and Affiliated Forces (PMC or PMF) militia forces (aka Popular Mobilization Units or PMU) until ISIS’s territorial defeat in 2017; fought in support of the ASAD regime in Syria from 2011 until at least 2017 where it claimed the loss of about 700 fighters; in 2017, AAH’s affiliated political party (Al Sadiqun Bloc) was approved by the Iraqi electoral commission to run in the national election; in 2018, Al Sadiqun joined the Al Fatah Alliance (Victory), a political coalition primarily comprised of parties affiliated with Iranian-backed Shia militias; in late 2019, it participated in an assault on the US Embassy compound in Baghdad; largely follows the directives of Iran’s IRGC Qods Force and has vowed revenge on the US for the death of the Iranian Qods Force commander in early 2020; continued to be active into 2023, including indirect fire attacks on US facilities in Iraq, typically using front names or proxy groups
goals: maintain a Shia-controlled government in Iraq, promote Iran's political and religious influence in Iraq, and expel the remaining US military presence
leadership and organization: led by Qays al-KHAZALI; maintains a paramilitary force inside the PMC/PMF that is divided into three brigades (the 41st, 42nd, and 43rd PMC brigades) representing geographic sectors of Iraq; reportedly models itself after Lebanese Hizballah
area(s) of operation: maintains political offices in Baghdad, Al Basrah, An Najaf, Babil, Salah ad Din, and Ninawa Governorates; militia forces reportedly dominate the area from Baghdad to Samarra; probably active in Syria in 2022
targets, tactics, and weapons: targets foreign military forces, US interests, ISIS, and Sunni Muslims; from 2006 to 2011, claimed to have conducted more than 6,000 attacks against US and Coalition forces using small arms, road side bombs, car bombs, and mortars; has carried out abductions, executions, and targeted killings of Sunni Muslims; fought as a paramilitary/irregular force in Syria and alongside the Iraqi military; armed with a variety of weapons, including small arms, machine guns, rocket-propelled grenades, mortars, rockets, artillery, armed unmanned aerial vehicles, improvised explosive devices, and armored vehicles
strength: estimated in 2023 to have up to 15,000 members
financial and other support: receives funding, logistical support, training, and weapons from the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Force-Qods Force and Lebanese Hizballah; solicits donations online and through a pro-Iran television channel; also raises funds through legitimate business enterprises, as well as criminal activities, including kidnappings-for-ransom, smuggling, and taxing/extortion of economic activities in areas where the group is dominant; AAH’s official status provides some members government salaries and access to state resources
designation: placed on the US Department of State's list of Foreign Terrorist Organizations on 10 January 2020
Asbat al-Ansar (AAA)
aka: Band of Helpers; Band of Partisans; League of Partisans; League of the Followers; God’s Partisans; Gathering of Supporters; Partisan’s League; Esbat al-Ansar; Isbat al-Ansar; Osbat al-Ansar; Usbat al-Ansar; Usbat ul-Ansar
history: emerged in the early 1990s in Lebanon under the late Shaykh Hisham SHRAID, a Palestinian refugee and preacher; until the 2000s, was known for assassinating Lebanese religious leaders and government officials, as well as bombing venues it deemed un-Islamic and representing Western influence, such as nightclubs, theaters, and liquor stores; from 2005 to 2011, some members fought against US and Coalition forces in Iraq; has links to al-Qa’ida and other Sunni terrorist groups; has not claimed responsibility for any attacks in recent years, but remains active
goals: overthrow the Lebanese Government, rid Lebanon of Western influence; destroy Israel and establish an Islamic state in the Levant; oppose Christian, secular, and Shia Muslim institutes operating in the Levant
leadership and organization: not available
areas of operation: primary base of operations is the Ayn al-Hilwah Palestinian refugee camp near Sidon in southern Lebanon; has been reluctant to involve itself in operations in Lebanon in recent years, in part because of concerns of losing its safe haven in the camp
targets, tactics, and weapons: until the mid-2000s, operatives conducted small-scale bombing and shooting attacks in Lebanon against Christian, secular, and Shia Muslim figures and institutions, elements of foreign influence inside the country, and Lebanese government officials, such as judges; has also plotted against foreign diplomatic targets; weapons include small arms, rocket-propelled grenades, and improvised explosive devices
strength: estimated in 2021 to have a few hundred members
financial resources: receives donations from sympathizers and through international Sunni extremist networks
designation: placed on the US Department of State's list of Foreign Terrorist Organizations on 27 March 2002
Boko Haram (BH)aka: Nigerian Taliban; Jama’atu Ahlus-Sunnah Lidda’Awati Wal Jihad; Jama’atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda’awati wal-Jihad; Jama’atu Ahlus-Sunnah (JAS); People Committed to the Prophet’s Teachings for Propagation and Jihad; Sunni Group for Preaching and Jihad
history: formed in 2002 under the late Muslim cleric Mohammed YUSUF; in 2009, launched an insurgency and campaign of terror against the Nigerian Government, its security forces, and civilians; by 2015, had captured territory roughly the size of Belgium in northeastern Nigeria; since 2015, the Nigerian military has dislodged Boko Haram from almost all of the territory it previously controlled, although the group continues to operate and conduct attacks in Nigeria, as well as in Cameroon, Chad, and Niger; in 2015, the group declared allegiance to the Islamic State in Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) and began calling itself ISIS in West Africa (ISIS-WA); following an ISIS decision regarding a change in leadership in 2016, the group split into two factions with one group continuing its activities under the original Boko Haram leader, Abubakar bin Muhammad SHEKAU and the other continuing as ISIS-WA; continued conducting attacks and maintained a limited safehaven in northeast Nigeria into 2023; was also engaged in fighting with ISIS-WA, the Nigerian military, and the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF), which is comprised of troops from Benin, Cameroon, Chad, Niger, and Nigeria; fighting had resulted in the loss of territory and heavy casualties, including battlefield losses, defections to ISIS-WA, desertions, and surrenders to government forces; between 2009 and 2023, violence associated with Boko Haram and ISIS-WA has killed an estimated 40,000 people, mostly civilians, and displaced as many as 3 million
goals: establish an Islamic state in Nigeria based on Islamic law
leadership and organization: reportedly Bakoura BUDUMA (aka Bakoura Doro or Doron Bakura); Abubakar bin Muhammad SHEKAU led BH from 2009 until his death in May 2021; BH is reportedly a fractious group with a decentralized organizational structure; had a shura council under SHEKAU that commanded the group’s regionally based cells/commands; cells/commands operated with some autonomy; also under the shura were departments for logistics, propaganda, training and education, finance, weapons procurement, recruitment, and legal/religious issues
areas of operation: most active in northeastern Nigeria (Borno State); in December 2020, the group claimed the abduction of 300 schoolchildren in the northwestern Nigerian state of Katsina; also operates in northern Cameroon, southeastern Niger, and areas of Chad near Lake Chad; police have arrested suspected Boko Haram members in Chad’s capital, N’Djamena
targets, tactics, and weapons: targets tourists and other foreigners (particularly businessmen), wealthy civilians, and government leaders to kidnap for ransom or kill; conducts shootings and suicide bombing attacks against government buildings, military installations, police stations, schools, markets, places of worship and entertainment, and sometimes entire villages; has kidnapped thousands of civilians, including children, many of whom are either forced or indoctrinated into fighting with the group or conducting suicide bombings; some female captives are subjected to forced labor and sexual servitude; conducts an insurgency combining guerrilla warfare and terrorist tactics against military and security forces; uses small arms, light and heavy machine guns, landmines, mortars, rockets, armored vehicles, trucks mounted with machine guns (aka "technicals"), improvised explosive devices, car bombs, and suicide bombings;
strength: unclear; estimated in 2022 to have about 1,000 fighters; the group has taken heavy losses from casualties, defections, desertions, and surrenders
financial and other support: largely self-financed through criminal activities such as looting, extortion, kidnapping-for-ransom, bank robberies, cattle rustling, and assassinations for hire; has seized vehicles, weapons, ammunition, and other supplies from the Nigerian and Nigerien militaries and has acquired other arms from the regional black market
designation: placed on the US Department of State's list of Foreign Terrorist Organizations on 14 November 2013
Communist Party of the Philippines/New People's Army (CPP/NPA)
aka: Communist Party of the Philippines; CPP; New People’s Army; NPA; Bagong Hukbong Bayan or BHB; Communist Party of the Philippines-New People's Army-National Democratic Front or CPP-NPA-NDF
history: CPP formed in 1968 and followed in 1969 by the creation of its armed/military wing, the NPA; since 1971, has waged a Maoist-based insurgency and terrorist campaign against the Philippine Government that has resulted in about 40,000 civilian and combatant deaths; from 2016 to 2019, several attempts were made to establish a cease-fire and peace deal between the CPP/NPA and the Philippine Government without success; talks typically broke down when each side accused the other of initiating attacks or violating cease-fires; in 2019 and 2020, the CPP/NPA continued attacks against security forces and civilians; the deadliest was a 2019 offensive in which CPP/NPA used improvised bombs to kill six Philippine troops on Samar Island; Philippine security forces continued to conduct operations against the group into 2023
goals: destabilize the Philippines’ economy to inspire the populace to revolt; ultimately wants to overthrow the government and install a Maoist-based regime; opposes the US military and commercial presence in the Philippines
leadership and organization: unclear following the death of its long-time leader Jose Maria SISON in December 2022; highest leadership body is its 26-member Central Committee, which reported to SISON; organized in "fronts" or regions but operates in cells and platoons at the local level; overt political wing is known as the National Democratic Front
areas of operation: operates primarily in rural Luzon, Visayas, and parts of northern and eastern Mindanao but also maintains cells in Manila and other metropolitan areas
targets, tactics, and weapons: targets military and security forces, government officials and facilities, local infrastructure (including power facilities, telecommunication towers, and bridges), foreign enterprises, and businesses that refuse to pay “revolutionary taxes”; follows a Maoist-inspired protracted guerrilla warfare strategy; uses guerrilla tactics, including ambushes, bombings, assassinations, raids on military and security posts, and kidnapping security personnel; also has attacked local infrastructure, plantations, mines, foreign enterprises, and US personnel and interests (has not attacked a US citizen or facility since 2001, however); employs small arms, light weapons, grenades, improvised explosive devices, and landmines; has employed city-based assassination squads at times
strength: estimated in 2023 to have as few as 2,000 fighters (from a peak of about 25,000 armed members in the late 1980s)
financial and other support: raises funds through theft and extortion, including extracting “revolutionary taxes” from local businesses; probably also receives donations from sympathizers in the Philippines, Europe, and elsewhere; arms and ammunition largely stolen or captured from Philippine military and security forces or acquired on the black market
designation –placed on the US Department of State's list of Foreign Terrorist Organizations on 9 August 2002
Continuity Irish Republican Army (CIRA)
aka: Continuity Army Council; Continuity IRA; Republican Sinn Fein
history: terrorist splinter group that became operational in 1986 as the clandestine armed wing of Republican Sinn Fein, following its split from Sinn Fein; “Continuity” refers to the group’s belief that it is carrying on the original goal of the Irish Republican Army (IRA) of forcing the British out of Northern Ireland; rejects ceasefires, weapons decommissioning, and all peace accords, including the Belfast Agreement and the 1998 Good Friday Agreement; cooperates with the larger Real IRA (RIRA), a US-designated terrorist group; in June 2017, released a statement claiming it would disband and decommission some of its arms over the following three months, describing the conflict as a “futile war”; however, the group remained active through 2022 and members have claimed several attacks in recent years
goals: disrupt the Northern Ireland peace process, remove British rule in Northern Ireland and, ultimately, unify Ireland
leadership and organization: operations are guided by its Irish Continuity Army Council
areas of operation: has been active in Belfast and the border areas of Northern Ireland
targets, tactics, and weapons: targets the British military, Northern Ireland security forces, and Loyalist paramilitary groups; has carried out bombings, assassinations, hijackings, extortion operations, and robberies; on occasion, has provided advance warning to police of its attacks; members are typically equipped with small arms and explosives
strength: estimated in 2022 to have fewer than 50 members; police counterterrorism operations have reduced the group’s strength considerably
financial and other support: receives donations from local and international sympathizers, but the majority of funds are obtained through criminal activity, including bank robberies, extortion, and smuggling
designation: placed on the US Department of State's list of Foreign Terrorist Organizations on 13 July 2004
HAMAS
aka: the Islamic Resistance Movement; Harakat al-Muqawama al-Islamiya; Izz al-Din al Qassam Battalions; Izz al-Din al Qassam Brigades; Izz al-Din al Qassam Forces; Students of Ayyash; Student of the Engineer; Yahya Ayyash Units; Izz al-Din al-Qassim Brigades; Izz al-Din alQassim Forces; Izz al-Din al-Qassim Battalions
history: established in 1987 at the onset of the first Palestinian uprising, or Intifada, as an outgrowth of the Palestinian branch of the Muslim Brotherhood; prior to 2005 conducted numerous attacks against Israel, including more than 50 suicide bombings; in addition to its anti-Israel stance, used a network of Dawa or social services that included charities, schools, clinics, youth camps, fundraising, and political activities to help build grassroots support amongst Palestinians in Gaza; won the Palestinian Legislative Council elections in 2006, giving it control of significant Palestinian Authority (PA) ministries in Gaza; expelled the PA and its dominant political faction Fatah in a violent takeover in 2007; since 2007, it has engaged in sporadic rocket attacks, border clashes, organized protests, and periodic targeted attacks against Israeli citizens, including a suicide bombing in 2016; it fought significant conflicts with Israel in 2008-2009, 2012, 2014, and 2021, typically involving HAMAS rocket attacks against Israel and Israeli air and artillery counter-strikes on HAMAS targets in Gaza, as well as Israeli military ground incursions; remained the de facto ruler of Gaza as of 2023; in October 2023 it conducted a surprise ground attack into Israel, supported by rockets and armed drones, killing large numbers of Israelis and foreigners, mostly civilians, and sparking another war with Israel
goals: maintain control of the Gaza Strip to facilitate Palestinian nationalist aims; the group’s charter calls for establishing an Islamic Palestinian state in place of Israel and rejects all agreements made between the Palestine Liberation Organization and Israel
leadership and organization: Ismail HANIYEH is the senior political leader while Mohammed DEIF is the military wing commander; has a shura council as its central consultative body; has smaller shura/executive committees to supervise political activities, military operations, social services, finances, and media relations; military wing (the 'Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades) organized into approximately six "brigades," special forces (Nukhba Special Forces), and various paramilitary units; Al-Aqsa TV is the group's primary media outlet
areas of operation: has controlled Gaza since 2007 and has a presence in the West Bank; also has a presence in the Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon and key regional capitals such as Doha, Qatar, and Cairo
targets, tactics, and weapons: targets Israeli military forces and civilians, as well as Islamic State and other Salafist armed group members based in Gaza; has conducted suicide bombings (carried out a suicide attack on a bus in Jerusalem in 2016 that killed 20 people), improvised explosive attacks, shootings, and rocket launches; fired more than 4,000 rockets at Israel during both the 50-day conflict in 2014 and the 11-day conflict in 2021; weapons include small arms, light and heavy machine guns, rockets (some with ranges of up to 200kms), mortars, rocket-propelled grenades, man-portable air defense systems, anti-tank missiles, armed unmanned aerial vehicles, and improvised explosive devices (IEDs), including balloons armed with IEDs or designed to start fires; has also engaged in cyber espionage and computer network exploitation operations
strength: estimates in 2023 ranged from 20,000 to 40,000 fighters
financial and other support: the military wing receives funding, weapons, and training from Iran and procures additional weapons from the regional black market; weapons are typically supplied through tunnels under the border with Sinai and/or through maritime smuggling routes; also raises funds in some Gulf countries as well as through business taxation, donations from Palestinian expatriates, international investments, and through its own charity organizations
designation: placed on the US Department of State's list of Foreign Terrorist Organizations on 8 October 1997
Haqqani Network (HQN)
aka: Haqqani Taliban Network, Afghanistan Mujahidin
history: formed in the late 1980s during the then-Soviet Union’s occupation of Afghanistan; founder, Jalaluddin HAQQANI, established a relationship with Usama BIN LADIN in the mid-1980s and joined the Taliban in 1995; helped the Taliban capture the capital, Kabul, in 1996; after the fall of the Taliban to US and allied forces in 2001, HAQQANI retreated to Pakistan where, under the leadership of his son, Sirajuddin HAQQANI (Jalaluddin HAQQANI reportedly died in 2018), continued to conduct an insurgency in Afghanistan against the Afghan Government and its security forces, Afghan civilians, and foreign military forces; insurgency continued until the collapse of the Afghan Government in August 2021; semi-autonomous component of the Afghan Taliban and a close ally of al-Qa’ida; cooperates with other regional terrorist groups, including the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan and Lashkar e-Tayyiba; following the Taliban takeover of Afghanistan, it secured control of the de facto ministries of interior, intelligence, and immigration and largely controlled the country's internal security
goals: prior to August 2021, expel foreign military forces from Afghanistan and replace the Afghan Government with an Islamic state operating according to a strict Salafi Muslim interpretation of sharia under the Afghan Taliban
leadership and organization: operational commander is Sirajuddin HAQQANI, who leads the group through its Peshawar Shura, which features both military and political wings and consists of Haqqani family members along with veteran commanders trusted by the family; during the insurgency, it operated under Taliban command and control but maintained significant autonomy and regional influence in its area of operations in southeast Afghanistan; beginning in 2015, HAQQANI was the deputy leader of the Afghan Taliban, and as of 2023 was the acting interior minister for the de facto Taliban government
areas of operation: Afghanistan; Pakistan (leadership historically maintained a power base around Pakistan’s tribal areas and a presence in Pakistan’s settled areas)
targets, tactics, and weapons: employed insurgency-type tactics, including coordinated small-arms assaults coupled with the use of mortars and rockets, rocket-propelled grenades, improvised explosive devices, suicide attacks, and car/truck bombs; also targeted the Afghan Government, civilians, and foreigners with kidnappings, bombings, and suicide attacks; attacked government buildings, hotels, embassies, markets, and schools; conducted some of Afghanistan’s most deadly bombings, including truck bomb attacks in Kabul in 2017 and 2018 that killed more than 250 civilians; in 2019, conducted multiple attacks in Kabul that killed 100 people and injured more than 500; equipped with small arms, light and heavy machine guns, mortars, rockets, rocket-propelled grenades, and improvised explosive devices
strength: estimated in 2022 to have 3-5,000 fighters, although some size estimates are as high as 10,000; numbers likely fluctuate based on time of year and battlefield operations
financial and other support: in addition to the funding it received as part of the broader Afghan Taliban, received some assistance from donors in Pakistan and the Gulf; most funds are from taxing local commerce, extortion, smuggling, kidnapping-for-ransom, and other licit and illicit business ventures; recruits, trains, raises funds, resupplies, and plans operations in the tribal areas of Pakistan; reportedly receives weapons smuggled in from Iran and Pakistan
designation: placed on the US Department of State's list of Foreign Terrorist Organizations on 19 September 2012
Harakat Sawa'd Misr (HASM)
aka: HASM Movement; Arms of Egypt Movement; HASSAM; HASAM; Harakah Sawa'id Misr; Movement of Egypt's Arms
history: formed in 2015; the group is in part composed of alienated Muslim Brotherhood (MB) members who view violence rather than dialogue as a more effective means to overthrow the Egyptian Government and operate independent of MB; in 2016, the group claimed responsibility for the assassination of a senior Egyptian security official, as well as the attempted assassination of Egypt's former Grand Mufti; following a January 2017 shootout with Egyptian security forces in Cairo, HASM declared a jihad against the Egyptian Government; later in 2017, it claimed an ambush attack that killed more than 50 Egyptian security forces and an attack on Burma's embassy in Cairo; in January 2019, it conducted a car bomb attack targeting security forces in Giza, which it claimed killed or wounded 10 soldiers; in August of the same year, it was held responsible (but denied responsibility) for a car bomb attack on a government health institute in Cairo, killing at least 20 people and injuring dozens; continued to be active in 2022
goals: overthrow the Egyptian Government and replace it with an Islamic regime
leadership and organization: Yahya al-Sayyid Ibrahim MUSA and Alaa Ali Mohammed al-SAMAHI (both based in Turkey); organization is not available, but probably operates in small, loosely connected cells and networks
areas of operation: Egypt (some leaders in Turkey)
targets, tactics, and weapons: primarily Egyptian security officials and other government-affiliated targets; typical attacks include ambushes, shootings, and bombings, including car bombings; employs improvised explosive devices and small arms
strength: not available
financial and other support: not available
designation - placed on the US Department of State's list of Foreign Terrorist Organizations on 14 January 2021
Harakat ul-Jihad-i-Islami (HUJI)
aka: Movement of Islamic Holy War; Harkat-ul-Jihad-al Islami; Harkat-al-Jihad-ul Islami; Harkat-ul-Jehad-al-Islami; Harakat ul Jihad-e-Islami; Harakat-ul Jihad Islami
history: formed in 1980 in Afghanistan to fight against the former Soviet Union; following the Soviet withdrawal in 1989, redirected its efforts to the cause of Muslims in the Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir; also has supplied fighters to the Taliban in Afghanistan to fight Afghan, Coalition, and US forces; has experienced internal splits, and a portion of the group aligned with al-Qa’ida; largely inactive and has not publicly claimed any attacks since 2015; status unclear
goals: annexation of the state of Jammu and Kashmir into Pakistan, expulsion of foreign forces from Afghanistan, and establishment of Islamic rule in Afghanistan, India, and Pakistan
leadership and organization: leadership not available; former leader, Qari Saifullah AKHTAR, killed by Afghan security services in 2017; organization not available, although it has an affiliated branch in Bangladesh and reportedly another one in Burma
areas of operation: historically extended throughout South Asia with operations focused on Afghanistan, India, and Pakistan
targets, tactics, and weapons: targeted Pakistani military, security, and police personnel, as well as Indian security forces in the Kashmir region and Indian Government officials; also targeted Hindu and Western civilians; most significant attack was the bombing of the New Delhi High Court in 2011, which killed 11 people and injured 76; claimed the bombing was intended to force India to repeal the death sentence of a HUJI member; attacks typically involved the use of small arms, grenades, and improvised explosive devices
strength: not available
financial and other support: not available
designation: placed on the US Department of State's list of Foreign Terrorist Organizations on 6 August 2010
Harakat ul-Jihad-i-Islami/Bangladesh (HUJI-B)
aka: Harakat ul Jihad e Islami Bangladesh; Harkatul Jihad al Islam; Harkatul Jihad; Harakat ul Jihad al Islami; Harkat ul Jihad al Islami; Harkat-ul-Jehad-al-Islami; Harakat ul Jihad Islami Bangladesh; Islami Dawat-e-Kafela; IDEK
history: formed in 1992 by a group of former Bangladeshi Afghan veterans wanting to establish Islamist rule in Bangladesh; HUJI-B leaders signed the February 1998 fatwa sponsored by Usama BIN LADEN that declared US civilians legitimate targets; in October 2005, Bangladeshi authorities banned the group; has connections to al-Qa’ida and Pakistani terrorist groups advocating similar objectives, including HUJI and Lashkar e-Tayyiba; activities have waned in recent years, but remained active as of 2023; Bangladeshi authorities arrested several HUJI members in January 2023
goals: install an Islamic state in Bangladesh; draws inspiration from al-Qaida and the Afghan Taliban
leadership and organization: leadership unclear; Bangladeshi authorities executed former leader Mufti Abdul HANNAN and two of his associates in 2017 for a 2004 grenade attack on the British High Commissioner in Sylhet, Bangladesh; most of HUJI-B's other leadership have been in Bangladeshi custody for years
areas of operation: headquartered in Bangladesh and mostly active in the southeast; maintains a network of madrassas and training camps in Bangladesh; also active in India; members have reportedly fought in Burma
targets, tactics, and weapons: conducts low-level bombing attacks against Bangladeshi officials and Westerners; also targets activists, bloggers, academics, religious minorities, and political rallies; most lethal attack occurred in 2004, when operatives lobbed grenades during a political rally in Dhaka, killing 24 and injuring about 400 others; attackers typically use small arms, hand grenades, and various explosives, including petrol bombs and improvised explosive devices
strength: not available
financial and other support: garners donations from sympathetic individuals and organizations; probably also garners funds from criminal activiities, including piracy, smuggling, and arms running
designation: placed on the US Department of State's list of Foreign Terrorist Organizations on 5 March 2008
Harakat ul-Mujahidin (HUM)
aka: Harakat ul-Ansar; HUA; Jamiat ul-Ansar; JUA; al-Faran; al-Hadid; al-Hadith; Harakat ul-Mujahidin; Ansar ul Ummah
history: formed in 1985 under Maulana Fazlur Rahman KHALIL in the Pakistani state of Punjab as an anti-Soviet jihadist group that splintered from Harakat ul-Jihad-i-Islami (HUJI); operated terrorist training camps in eastern Afghanistan until US air strikes destroyed them in 2001; a significant portion of the group defected to Jaysh-e-Mohammed after 2000; in 2003, began using the name Jamiat ul-Ansar; Pakistan banned the group the same year; has long been an ally of al-Qa’ida and has links to other terrorist groups in the region, including Lashkar-e-Taiba, Jaish-e-Muhammad, and Lashkar-e-Jhangvi; activities have waned in recent years; status unclear; has not claimed responsibility for any attacks since 2018
goals: annex the Indian Union Territory of Jammu and Kashmir into Pakistan
leadership and organization: Dr. Badr MUNIR has led the group since 2005; organization unavailable
areas of operation: operates primarily in Afghanistan and in the Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir; also operates in Muzaffarabad in Pakistan-administered Azad Kashmir and in other cities in Pakistan
targets, tactics, and weapons: conducted numerous attacks against Indian troops, government officials, and civilians in the state of Jammu and Kashmir, as well as in India’s northeastern states, especially between 2005 and 2013; also attacked Western targets, such as the 2002 suicide car bombing of a bus carrying French workers in Karachi, Pakistan, that killed 15 and wounded 20; uses various attack methods, including suicide bombings, airplane hijackings, kidnappings, and assassinations; typically used small arms, grenades, and improvised explosive devices
strength: estimated in 2021 to have only a small number of cadres active
financial and other support: receives donations from wealthy supporters in Pakistan
designation: placed on the US Department of State's list of Foreign Terrorist Organizations on 8 October 1997
Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS)/al-Nusrah Front (ANF)
aka: Jabhat al-Nusrah; Jabhet al-Nusrah; The Victory Front; al-Nusrah Front for the People of the Levant; al-Nusrah Front in Lebanon; Jabhat al-Nusra li-Ahl al-Sham min Mujahedi al-Sham fi Sahat al-Jihad; Support Front for the People of the Levant; Jabhat Fath al-Sham; Jabhat Fath al Sham; Jabhat Fatah al-Sham; Jabhat Fateh al-Sham; Front for the Conquest of Syria; the Front for liberation of al Sham; Front for the Conquest of Syria/the Levant; Front for the Liberation of the Levant; Conquest of the Levant Front; Fatah al-Sham Front; Fateh al-Sham Front; Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham; Hay’et Tahrir al-Sham; Hayat Tahrir al-Sham; HTS; Assembly for the Liberation of Syria; Assembly for Liberation of the Levant; Liberation of al-Sham Commission; Liberation of the Levant Organization; Tahrir al-Sham; Tahrir al-Sham Hay’at
history: formed circa late 2011 as the al-Nusrah Front (Jabhat al-Nusrah) when former al-Qa’ida in Iraq (AQI) leader Abu Bakr al-BAGHDADI sent Syrian militant Abu Muhammad al-JAWLANI (var: al-GOLANI, al-JOLANI) to organize al-Qa'ida cells in Syria; split from AQI in early 2013 and became an independent entity; operated as Jabhat Fateh al-Sham briefly in 2016; in 2017, joined with four smaller Syrian Islamist factions (Harakat Nur al Din al Zenki, Liwa al Haqq, Ansar al Din, and Jaysh al Sunna) and created Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS, "Assembly for the Liberation of the Levant") as a vehicle to advance its position in Syria; since 2017, additional groups and individuals have joined; as of 2023, HTS was the dominate militant group in northwest Syria and asserted considerable influence and control over the so-called Syrian Salvation Government in the Iblib de-escalation zone where it continued to defend against attacks from Syrian Government forces and its allies and consolidate its position; maintained a tense relationship with al-Qa'ida affiliate in Syria Hurras al-Din (HAD) and has refused efforts to resolve differences; has reportedly detained or killed some HAD leaders; has openly clashed with the Islamic State of Iraq and ash-Sham (ISIS) and regularly detained ISIS members seeking to use Idlib as a safehaven
goals: unify under its banner the various anti-ASAD jihadist groups operating in Syria and consolidate its control over the Idlib region; ultimately oust Syrian President Bashar al-ASAD's regime and replace it with a Sunni Islamic state
leadership and organization: led by an overall commander (al-JAWLANI) assisted by a small consultative council (“majlis-ash-shura”); has up to 10 branches or ministries for political, religious, military, financial, civilian services, media, administrative affairs, and security services; operational structure varies from clandestine cells to paramilitary/semi-conventional military units organized as battalions and brigades; claims to have 10 brigades, each with the ability to operate independently with its own infantry, armor, supply, and fire support units; reportedly operates a commando unit known as the "Red Bands" or "Band of Deaths" that is responsible for conducting raids behind regime front lines
areas of operation: most territory held by the group is in Syria's Idlib province in the country's northwest, plus small parts of western Aleppo province
targets, tactics, and weapons: primarily attacks Syrian Government and pro-regime forces (including Iranian-backed) and other Syrian insurgent groups, including ISIS, as well as some minorities and civilians; engages in conventional and guerrilla-style attacks using small arms and other light weapons, artillery, rockets, landmines, anti-tank missiles, armored combat vehicles, and surface-to-air missiles; also known for using terrorist tactics, including assassinations and suicide attacks incorporating car bombs and explosive vests
strength: assessed in 2023 to have as many as 10,000 fighters, including about 1,000 foreign fighters
financial and other support: largely self-financed; derives funding from smuggling, extortion, taxes and fines on local populations and at border crossings it controls, plus some donations from external Gulf-based donors; taxes imposed on local populations include income, business, and services and utilities such as access to electricity, water, and bread; also raises funds through control of the import and distribution of fuel through a front company; has conducted kidnappings-for-ransom operations in the past; maintains training camps and provides some logistical support to like-minded groups; has also reportedly received military training from private foreign contractors
designation: placed on the US Department of State's list of Foreign Terrorist Organizations on 15 May 2014; on 31 May 2018, the Department of State amended the designation of al-Nusrah Front to include Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) and other aliases
Hizballah
aka: the Party of God; Hezbollah; Islamic Jihad; Islamic Jihad Organization; Revolutionary Justice Organization; Organization of the Oppressed on Earth; Islamic Jihad for the Liberation of Palestine; Organization of Right Against Wrong; Ansar Allah; Followers of the Prophet Muhammed; Lebanese Hizballah; Lebanese Hezbollah; LH; Foreign Relations Department; External Security Organization; Foreign Action Unit; Hizballah International; Special Operations Branch; External Services Organization; External Security Organization of Hezbollah
history: formed in 1982 following the Israeli invasion of Lebanon as a Shia militant group that takes its ideological inspiration from the Iranian revolution and the teachings of the late Ayatollah KHOMEINI; generally follows the religious guidance of the Iranian Supreme Leader, which since 1989 has been Ali Hoseini-KHAMENEI; closely allied with Iran and the two often work together on shared initiatives, although Hizballah also acts independently in some cases; shares a close relationship with the Syrian ASAD regime and has provided assistance; including thousands of fighters to regime forces in the Syrian civil war; since the early 1990s, has evolved into a business and political enterprise and become a state within a state in Lebanon with strong influence in Lebanon’s Shia community; actively participates in Lebanon’s political system and runs social programs, such as hospitals and schools; has seats in Lebanon's parliament (13 of 128 seats as of 2023) and has had members appointed to the Lebanese Government's ministries; military capabilities continue to expand and have the characteristics of both a paramilitary and a conventional military force; fought a month-long war with Israel in 2006 and continues to prepare for large-scale conflict with Israel; also continues to conduct direct attacks on Israel, including firing anti-tank missiles at an army base and vehicles near the border in 2019; in 2020-2022, Israel conducted multiple air strikes on Hizballah facilities in Lebanon and Syria, while Hizballah claimed responsibility for shooting down an Israel unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) and pledged to respond to Israeli air raids; the group remained active and continued its military buildup into 2023
goals: accrue military resources and political power and defend its position of strength in Lebanon; wants to expel Western influence from Lebanon and the greater Middle East, destroy the state of Israel, and establish Islamic rule in Lebanon and the Palestinian territories
leadership and organization: led by Secretary General Shaykh Sayyid Hasan NASRALLAH since 1992; NASRALLAH leads with two deputies through a 7-seat Shura Council; the Council has five subordinate specialized assemblies: the Executive, Judicial, Parliamentary, Political, and Jihad Councils; each assembly oversees several sub-entities that handle Hizballah’s affairs in various sectors; for example, the Jihad/Military council reportedly has 2 wings, the Islamic Resistance (combat operations) and the Security Organ (external and internal security operations): Islamic Resistance includes up to 4 territorial commands and at least 6 infantry, rocket/artillery, amphibious/coastal defense, and commando/special forces (Unit 1800) sub-units, plus multiple Lebanese militia (or "resistance") "brigades" which serve as auxiliary forces; the Security Organ has 2 sub-branches: Islamic Jihad Organization (External Security Organization, aka Unit 910) for external operations, including the group's international terrorist operations, recruitment, fundraising, intelligence gathering, and support to Shia militias abroad; the Party Security Organ is responsible for internal security; has a youth movement known as the al-Mahdi Scouts
areas of operation: headquartered in the southern suburbs of Beirut with a significant presence in the Bekaa Valley and southern Lebanon; however, operates around the world, and operatives and financiers have been arrested or detained in Africa, Asia, Europe, the Middle East, South America, and North America; deployed thousands of fighters to support the ASAD Government during the Syrian civil war and continues to maintain a presence there
targets, tactics, and weapons: targets include: Israeli security forces and civilians; Jews; US and Western military forces and other symbols of American/Western influence in the Middle East; entities in Syria combatting the ASAD regime, particularly Islamic State and al-Qa’ida affiliated forces; historically used a variety of guerrilla-style hit-and-run and terrorist tactics, particularly kidnappings and suicide vehicle bombings; some of its most devastating attacks involved the use of car/truck bombs, such as the 1983 attacks on the US Embassy, the US Marine barracks, and a French military base in Beirut, which killed over 300 civilians and military personnel; has conducted attacks on Israeli and Jewish targets abroad, including the 1992 bombing of the Israeli Embassy in Argentina and the 1994 suicide bombing of a Jewish community center in Argentina, which killed more than 100 and wounded more than 500 others; since the 2000s, has developed elements of a more traditional state-like conventional military force and demonstrated considerable military capabilities in the 2006 conflict with Israel and during the Syrian civil war; forces are equipped with small arms, light and heavy machineguns, mortars, landmines, improvised explosive devises, artillery, armored combat vehicles, rockets, antiaircraft guns, ballistic missiles, anti-ship cruise missiles, armed unmanned aerial vehicles, man-portable air defense systems, and antitank guided missiles; the group is estimated to have upwards of 150,000 missiles and rockets of various types and ranges
strength: was estimated in 2022 to have up to 45,000 fighters, divided between approximately 20,000 full-time and 25,000 reserve personnel; in 2021, NASRALLAH claimed the group had 100,000 trained fighters; the group has thousands of supporters and members worldwide
financial and other support: receives most of its funding, training, and weapons, as well as political, diplomatic, and organizational aid, from Iran; in 2019, funding from Iran was estimated at more than $700 million per year, although economic sanctions since 2020 may have constrained Iran's ability to finance the group; Syria also furnishes training, weapons, and diplomatic and political support; has developed a network of training camps in Lebanon and runs most of its own military training; receives additional funding in the form of legal businesses, international criminal enterprises (including smuggling, narcotics trafficking, and money laundering), and donations from the Shia in Lebanon and Lebanese diaspora communities worldwide
designation - placed on the US Department of State's list of Foreign Terrorist Organizations on 8 October 1997
Hizbul Mujahideen (HM)
aka: Hizb-ul-Mujahideen; Party of Mujahideen; Party of Holy Warriors
history: formed in 1989 and is one of the largest and oldest militant separatist groups fighting against Indian rule in the state of Jammu and Kashmir; reportedly operated in Afghanistan through the mid-1990s and trained alongside the Afghan Hizb-e-Islami Gulbuddin until the Taliban takeover; made up primarily of ethnic Kashmiris and has conducted operations jointly with other Kashmiri militant groups; active in 2022
goals: supports the liberation of the territory of Jammu and Kashmir from Indian control and its accession to Pakistan, although some cadres are pro-independence
leadership and organization - led by Syed SALAHUDDIN (aka Mohammad Yusuf SHAH); reportedly organized in five regionally-based divisions; probably operates in small loosely connected networks and cells
areas of operation: headquartered in Pakistan but conducts operations primarily in India, particularly the Indian Union Territory of Jammu and Kashmir
targets, tactics, and weapons: focuses attacks on Indian security forces and politicians in the state of Jammu and Kashmir; most attacks involved small arms and grenades, although it has also utilized improvised explosive devices, including vehicle-mounted
strength: specific numbers not available, but information from 2020 suggested a cadre of up to 1,500 fighters
financial and other support: specific sources of support are not clear, but probably originate in Pakistan, as well as from local fundraising
designation - placed on the US Department of State's list of Foreign Terrorist Organizations on 17 August 2017
Hurras al-Din
aka: Tanzim Hurras al-Din; Tandhim Hurras al-Din; Hurras al-Deen; Houras al-Din; HAD; al-Qa‘ida in Syria; Guardians of the Religion Organization; Sham al-Ribat
history: publicly announced itself in February 2018 as an al-Qa‘ida affiliate after its members broke away from al-Nusrah Front (subsequently rebranded as Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, or HTS) because HTS publicly cut ties with al-Qa'ida; maintains allied or cooperative relationships with several extremist elements in Syria, including Jamaat Ansar al-Islam, the Turkestan Islamic Party (TIP), Sham al-Islam, and Ansar al-Tawhid; viewed as the leading force behind the “Incite the Believers” jihadist alliance in Syria, which conducts battlefield operations against Syrian Government forces in northern Syria; since 2020, has had a tense relationship HTS/al-Nusrah Front, which controls Syria's northwestern province of Iblib, that has involved assassinations, open clashes, competition for recruits, and arrests of its members by HTS; rejected the March 2020 Russian-Turkish ceasefire agreement in Idlib and has attacked Turkish forces and conducted attacks in Turkish-controlled areas; in 2021, it attacked a Russian military base in eastern Raqqa province and a conducted a bombing attack against Syrian military forces in Damascus; remained active into 2023, but had been weakened by internal divisions and leadership losses and was overshadowed by HTS
goals: oust Syrian President Bashar al-ASAD’s regime and replace it with a Sunni Islamic State; likely adheres to al-Qa‘ida’s chief objectives of neutralizing Israeli and US influence within the Middle East, specifically within the Levant
leadership and organization: led by Syrian jihadist Samir HIJAZI (aka Abu Hamamm al-Shami, Faruq al-Suri, Mohammed Abu Khalid al-Suri), who previously served as a top military commander in al-Nusrah Front and worked as a trainer in al-Qa‘ida’s camps in Afghanistan in the early 2000s; a number of veteran jihadists who defected from al-Nusrah Front or joined from other jihadist groups across the Levant serve in the group’s leadership apparatus or provide support to the group’s goals; has a shura council; as of 2020, was comprised of at least 16 jihadist factions; sub-structure unknown, but probably organized into cells and “battalions”
areas of operation: headquartered in Syria’s Idlib Province in the northwest; also operationally active in the Syrian provinces of Latakia, Hama, and Raqqa
targets, tactics, and weapons: primarily attacks Syrian Government and pro-regime forces; has also conducted armed assaults against Turkish and Russian military forces active in Syria; potentially responsible for the kidnapping of aid workers in northwestern Syria; has encouraged violent attacks against Israeli and Western targets in its propaganda releases; has conducted assassinations and car bombings; armed largely with small arms, bombs, explosives (including vehicle mounted improvised explosive devices), mortars, machine guns, and trucks mounting machine guns (aka “technicals”)
strength: estimates in 2023 vary widely, from as few as 300 to as many as 2,000 fighters, including foreigners
financial and other support: appeals for donations under the auspices of supporting its efforts against the Syrian Government; leverages social media platforms to call for financial assistance, public support, and recruits; active in training operatives at a number of unspecified training camps in Syria
designation: placed on the US Department of State's list of Foreign Terrorist Organizations on 5 September 2019
Indian Mujahedeen (IM)
aka: Indian Mujahidin; Islamic Security Force-Indian Mujahideen (ISF-IM)
history: formed as an ultra-conservative Islamic movement circa 2004 from remnants of the radical youth organization Students Islamic Movement of India; responsible for dozens of bomb attacks throughout India since 2005 and the deaths of hundreds of civilians; maintains ties to other terrorist entities including Pakistan-based Lashkar e-Tayyiba, Jaish-e-Mohammed, and Harakat ul-Jihad Islami; outlawed in India in 2010; by 2016, was increasingly linked to the Islamic State of Iraq and ash-Sham (ISIS); that year, six IM operatives were identified in an ISIS propaganda video threatening attacks on India, and an IM cell linked to ISIS was reportedly plotting attacks on multiple targets in India; Indian authorities claimed they disrupted bombing plots by the group in 2015 and 2017 and have apprehended dozens of suspected IM operatives; has not publicly claimed any attacks in recent years
goals: establish Islamic rule in India; stated goal is to carry out terrorist operations against Indians for their perceived oppression of Muslims
leadership and organization: unclear; reportedly Mohammed Riyaz BHATKA; Indian security services have captured or killed a number of alleged leaders of the group, including co-founder Yasin BHATKAL, who was arrested in 2018; organization not available but probably operates in small, loosely connected networks and cells
areas of operation: has conducted attacks throughout India since 2005; reportedly also operates in Nepal and Pakistan
targets, tactics, and weapons: known for carrying out multiple coordinated bombings in crowded areas against Indian and Western civilian and economic targets, including restaurants and commercial centers; in 2008, was responsible for 16 synchronized bomb blasts in crowded urban centers, including an attack in Delhi that killed 30 people and an attack at a local hospital in Ahmedabad that killed 38 (note - in 2022, an Indian court sentenced 38 individuals to death for the attack in Aghmedabad); in 2010, bombed a popular German bakery frequented by tourists in Pune, India, killing 17 and wounding more than 60 people; attackers typically use improvised explosive devices
strength: not available
financial and other support: probably receives funding and support from other terrorist organizations, as well as from unspecified donors in Pakistan and the Middle East
designation: placed on the US Department of State's list of Foreign Terrorist Organizations on 19 September 2011
Islamic Jihad Union (IJU)
aka: Islamic Jihad Group; IJG; Islomiy Jihod Ittihodi; al-Djihad al-Islami; Dzhamaat Modzhakhedov; Islamic Jihad Group of Uzbekistan; Jamiat al-Jihad al-Islami; Jamiyat; The Jamaat Mojahedin; The Kazakh Jama’at; The Libyan Society
history: emerged in 2002 as a splinter movement of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) after internal splits over goals; originally known as the Islamic Jihad Group but was renamed Islamic Jihad Union in 2005; committed to overthrowing the government of Uzbekistan, but has been active in other areas outside Central Asia, particularly Afghanistan, but also Pakistan, Syria, and Europe; pledged allegiance to the Afghan Taliban in August 2015 and participated in Taliban attacks on the Afghan city of Kunduz, as well as Afghan military bases; continues to maintain a presence in Afghanistan; participated in the Syrian conflict as part of a coalition of al-Qa’ida-linked terrorist groups
goals: overthrow the Uzbek government and replace it with an Islamic state; support al-Qa’ida’s overall goals, including efforts to create an Islamic State in Syria
leadership and organization: Ilimbek MAMATOV; probably operates in a loose network of cells
areas of operation: Afghanistan, Syria, Turkey, Uzbekistan, and Europe
targets, tactics, and weapons: targets international and Afghan military and security forces in Afghanistan and Syrian regime forces using a variety of guerrilla warfare and terrorist tactics; has attacked security checkpoints, law enforcement facilities, market places, and foreign embassies in Uzbekistan, often with suicide bombers; in 2007, an IJU cell in Germany (known as the “Sauerland Cell”) attempted to construct and detonate a series of car bombs to carry out a mass attack, but the militants were arrested before they could carry out the attack and were ultimately convicted; fighters are armed with small arms, light and heavy machine guns, rocket-propelled grenades, antiaircraft weapons, and various explosives including improvised explosive devices and car bombs
strength: estimated in 2021 to have 100-200 members in Afghanistan, but reportedly has strengthened since the fall of the Afghan Government in August 2021
financial and other support: specific sources of support are not available but probably receives assistance from allied terrorist groups and sympathetic donors
designation: placed on the US Department of State's list of Foreign Terrorist Organizations on 17 June 2005
Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU)
aka: Islamic Party of Uzbekistan; Islamskaia partiia Turkestana;, byvshee Islamskoe dvizhenie Uzbekistana; Islamic Movement of Turkistan
history: formed in the early 1990s as a Sunni Muslim armed group in Uzbekistan's part of the Ferghana Valley, where the Uzbek, Kyrgyz, and Tajik borders converge; moved to Pakistan after the US-led invasion of Afghanistan in 2001; operated primarily along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border and in northern Afghanistan, where it fought against international forces despite its goal of setting up an Islamic state in Uzbekistan; was allied to al-Qa’ida, the Afghan Taliban, and Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan, and frequently conducted joint operations with those organizations; in 2011, some fighters broke off to fight separately alongside the Taliban against the Afghan Government under the name Khatiba Imam al-Bukhari, which had fighters in both Afghanistan and Syria as of 2022; in 2015, a significant faction, including the IMU's top leadership, pledged loyalty to the Islamic State of Iraq and ash-Sham (ISIS) and began cooperating with ISIS-Khorasan (ISIS-K); numerous IMU members, including its leader, were subsequently reported to have been killed in clashes with their former Taliban allies; operational tempo has decreased in recent years, but the group was active into 2023
goals: overthrow the Uzbek Government and establish an Islamic state
leadership and organization: Samatov MAMASOLI; probably structured as a network of cells
areas of operation: Afghanistan, Pakistan, Syria, Turkey, and Central Asia
targets, tactics, and weapons: targeted military and security forces and government facilities using guerrilla warfare and terrorist tactics, including ambushes, assassinations, ground assaults, indirect fire attacks, kidnappings, and suicide bombings; in 2010 the IMU claimed responsibility for an ambush that killed 25 Tajik troops in Tajikistan; in 2014, it claimed responsibility for an attack on Karachi’s international airport that resulted in the deaths of at least 39 people, as well as a 2012 attack on a Pakistani prison that freed nearly 400 prisoners (both attacks conducted jointly with the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan terrorist group); also has attacked government and allied foreign military forces in Afghanistan, as well as security forces in Pakistan; typically used small arms and light weapons, mortars, rockets, and various explosives, including car bombs and suicide vests
strength: unclear; reportedly about 700 in 2021, including family members
financial and other support: receives support from a large Uzbek diaspora, allied terrorist organizations, and sympathizers from Europe, Central and South Asia, and the Middle East; also engages in narcotics trafficking and conducts kidnappings for ransom
designation: placed on the US Department of State's list of Foreign Terrorist Organizations on 25 September 2000
Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)/Qods Force
aka: Islamic Revolutionary Guards, Pasdaran (Guards), Revolutionary Guards, Sepah (Corps), Sepah-e Pasdaran-e Enghelab-e Eslami; Quds ("Jerusalem") Force
history: formed in May 1979 in the immediate aftermath of Shah Mohammad Reza PAHLAVI’s fall, as leftists, nationalists, and Islamists jockeyed for power; while the interim prime minister controlled the government and state institutions, such as the army, followers of Ayatollah Ruhollah KHOMEINI organized counterweights, including the IRGC, to protect the Islamic revolution; the IRGC’s command structure bypassed the elected president and went directly to KHOMEINI; the Iran-Iraq War (1980–88) transformed the IRGC into more of a conventional fighting force with its own ground, air, naval, and special forces, plus control over Iran’s strategic missile and rocket forces; the IRGC is highly institutionalized and a parallel military force to Iran’s regular armed forces (Artesh); is heavily involved in internal security and have significant influence in the political and economic spheres of Iranian society, as well as Iran’s foreign policy; its special operations forces are known as the Qods Force which specializes in foreign missions, providing advice, funding, guidance, material support, training, and weapons to militants in countries such as Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, and Yemen, as well as extremist groups, including HAMAS, Hizballah, Kata’ib Hizballah, and Palestine Islamic Jihad
goals: protect Iran’s Islamic revolution and the state; spread Iranian/Shia influence; provide internal security, including border control, law enforcement, and suppressing domestic opposition; influence Iran’s politics, economy, and foreign policy
leadership and organization: General Hossein SALAMI is the commander of the IRGC; Brigadier General Ismail QAANI is the commander of the Qods Force; organized along the lines of a traditional conventional military force with Ground Forces, Navy (includes marines), Aerospace Force (includes the strategic missile forces), Cyber Command, Qods Force (special operations), and Basij Paramilitary Forces (aka Popular Mobilization Army); the IRGC also has branches for intelligence, counterintelligence, and security; the Qods Force is reportedly divided into branches focusing on intelligence/espionage, finance, politics, sabotage, and special operations, as well as at least 8 regionally-focused directorates
areas of operation: headquartered in Tehran; active throughout Iran and the Middle East region, as well as Afghanistan, Gaza, Iraq, Lebanon, Syria, and Yemen; has a worldwide capability to commit attacks if Iranian leadership deems it appropriate; in recent years, Qods Force planning for terror attacks has been uncovered and disrupted in a number of countries worldwide, including Albania, Bahrain, Belgium, Bosnia, Bulgaria, Denmark, France, Germany, Kenya, Turkey, and the United States
targets, tactics, and weapons: targets Israel, Sunni regimes perceived as a threat (particularly Saudi Arabia), the Islamic State (ISIS), US military forces in the Middle East, Iranian dissidents; has the capability to fight conventionally and conduct a wide-range of terrorist-type attacks; also makes extensive use of proxy and partner forces such as Hizballah; provides a wide range of arms to proxy/partner forces, including small arms, rockets, and armed unmanned aerial vehicles; armed as a conventional military with typical ground, air, and naval platforms and weapons; the IRGC-QF also has active and growing cyberwarfare capabilities
strength: estimates vary; assessed in 2022 to be approximately 125-190,000, including the Qods Force, whose estimated size ranges from 5,000-15,000; also controls the 90,000-member Basij Paramilitary Force, which augments internal security, suppresses domestic opposition, and can increase to several hundred thousand during a major mobilization
financial and other support: receives a portion of the Iranian defense budget, by some estimates as much as 50%; IRGC-linked companies control up to 20% of Iran’s economy; Qods Force also exerts control over strategic industries, commercial services, and black-market enterprises, and has engaged in large-scale illicit finance schemes and money laundering
designation: placed on the US Department of State's list of Foreign Terrorist Organizations on 15 April 2019
Islamic State of Iraq and ash-Sham - Democratic Republic of the Congo (ISIS-DRC)
aka: Allied Democratic Forces (ADF); Madina Tawheed wal Mujahideen (“the City of Monotheism and Holy Warriors”); Islamic State of Iraq and ash-Sham: Central Africa (ISIS-CA); Islamic State’s Central Africa Province (ISCAP); Wilayat Central Africa; Wilayah Central Africa
history: first mentioned as “ISIS-Central Africa” in an August 2018 speech by then-ISIS leader al-BAGHDADI; claimed its first attack against the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) military near the border with Uganda in April 2019; has its origins in the DRC-based militant group Allied Democratic Forces (ADF), which was founded in 1995 with the stated goal of overthrowing the Ugandan Government but shifted in the late 1990s to carrying out attacks against civilians, military forces, and UN peacekeepers in the DRC; many of ADF’s early members came from Uganda’s Salafist movement; online posts by some ADF members in 2016 and 2017 referred to their group as Madina Tawheed wal Mujahideen (“the City of Monotheism and Holy Warriors”) and displayed an ISIS-like flag; ISIS-DRC has been notorious for its brutal violence against Congolese citizens and regional military forces, with attacks killing approximately 4,000 civilians between 2014 and 2020, including about 850 in 2020; in October 2020, it launched an assault on a prison in the DRC city of Beni that resulted in the escape of about 1,300 prisoners, including nearly 250 ISIS/ADF fighters and sympathizers; continued conducting operations in 2022-2023, including its first suicide bombing in Goma (April 2022) and another prison break in North Kivu that freed 800 prisoners in August 2022
goals: implement ISIS’s strict interpretation of sharia and establish an Islamic state in central Africa
leadership and organization: Seka Musa BALUKU, who presides over a shura/executive council of senior leaders, including a military commander; military wing reportedly has sub-commanders for intelligence, operations, training, finances, logistics, and medical services
areas of operation: DRC, primarily in the Nord Kivu and Ituri provinces; also active in Uganda; has emerged as a regional conduit for facilitating funds transfers to ISIS cells in East Africa
targets, tactics, and weapons: Congolese civilians, particularly Christians, and military/security forces, as well as UN personnel; methods include frequent small-scale attacks, indiscriminate killings, ambushes, assassinations, kidnappings, and suicide bombings; ADF was sanctioned in 2014 by the US Department of the Treasury and the UN under the UN Security Council’s DRC sanctions regime for its violence and atrocities; uses small arms, machine guns, improvised explosive devices, rocket-propelled grenades, mortars, and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs)
strength: assessed in 2023 to have up to 2,000 fighters
financial and other support: reportedly receives some funding from control of mines and the export of minerals, as wells as from ISIS-Core through a web of financial mechanisms running through Kenya, Somalia, South Africa and Uganda; arms include seized weapons and ammunition from the DRC military
designation - placed on the US Department of State's list of Foreign Terrorist Organizations on 10 March 2021
Islamic State of Iraq and ash-Sham - East Asia (ISIS-EA) in the Philippines
aka: ISIS in the Philippines (ISIS-P); ISIL Philippines; ISIL in the Philippines; IS Philippines (ISP); Islamic State in the Philippines; Islamic State in Iraq and Syria in Southeast Asia; ISIS-East Asia; Dawlah Islamiyah; Dawlatul Islamiyah Waliyatul Masrik; Dawlatul Islamiyah Waliyatul Mashriq; IS East Asia Division; ISIS Branch in the Philippines; ISIS “Philippines province”
history: Islamic militants in the Philippines initially pledged allegiance to ISIS in 2014, however the group officially formed in 2016 with now-deceased leader Isnilon HAPILON as the first amir; ISIS media claimed its first attack in the Philippines against Philippine soldiers on Mindanao Island in March 2016; in May 2017, ISIS-EA and fighters from associated jihadist groups stormed and captured the city of Marawi on Mindanao; five months of subsequent fighting for the city between the militants and the Philippine military resulted in nearly 900 militants and more than 160 Philippine soldiers killed; over 300,000 residents were forced to flee the area during the fighting; in 2018, the group conducted the first ever suicide attack in the Philippines; ISIS-EA has since claimed several additional suicide and other high-profile bombings, including two suicide bombings undertaken by females within one hour of one another in August of 2020 in the capital of Sulu province; remained active in 2023 with low-level attacks and skirmishes, but was under considerable pressure from Philippine security forces
goals: create an Islamic state in the southern Philippines and across Southeast Asia adhering to ISIS’s strict interpretation of sharia
leadership and organization: unclear; latest leader (Jer MIMBANTAS, aka Abu Zacharia, aka Faharudin Hadji Satar) reportedly killed by Philippine security forces in June 2023; ISIS-EA is comprised of a loose network of groups with varying levels of allegiance and ties to ISIS, including the Abu Sayaf Group (ASG), the Maute Group (aka Daulah Islamiyah Fi Ranao, Islamic State of Lanao, Abu Zacaria Group), Ansar al-Khilafah Philippines (AKP), and a faction of the Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters (BIFF); these groups operate autonomously and maintain their own leaders and organizational structures
areas of operation: mostly in the southern Philippines, especially the Sulu Archipelago and western and central Mindanao; probably maintains a small presence in the capital, Manila; linked to ISIS elements in Indonesia
targets, tactics, and weapons: targets Philippine security forces but increasingly targets non-Muslim civilians; has attacked government-related targets, military bases and security checkpoints, churches, internet cafés, resorts, and street festivals; employs insurgent-type tactics, including armed assaults, mortar attacks, suicide bombers, and road-side bombs; weapons include small arms, improvised explosive devices, light and heavy machine guns, rocket-propelled grenades, mortars, and hand grenades
strength: estimated in 2022 to have a few hundred fighters
financial and other support: receives some financial assistance from ISIS-core, but mostly relies on criminal activities such as kidnappings for ransom and extortion; maintains training camps in remote areas under its control and acquires weapons through smuggling and captured or black market purchases of Philippine military arms; estimated to have a few dozen foreign fighters (mostly Indonesians and some Malaysians) who tend to assume key responsibilities such as financial and communications/media facilitators, bomb-makers, trainers, and attack planners/perpetrators; receives some media support from ISIS-core
designation: placed on the US Department of State's list of Foreign Terrorist Organizations on 28 February 2018
Islamic State of Iraq and ash-Sham - Mozambique (ISIS-M)
aka: Ansar al-Sunna; Helpers of Tradition; Ahl al-Sunna wa al-Jamaa; Adherents to the Traditions and the Community; al-Shabaab in Mozambique; Islamic State Central Africa province; Wilayah Central Africa; Ansaar Kalimat Allah; Supporters of the Word of Allah, "Mashababos"
history: based on a domestic terrorist group known as Ansar al-Sunna (aka al-Shabaab, among other names) that has conducted an insurgency against the Mozambique Government since 2017, and ISIS publicly recognized as an affiliate in June 2019; since 2017, violence associated with the group has led to the deaths of approximately 4,000 civilians, security force members, and suspected ISIS-M militants, and displaced approximately 800,000 persons in northern Mozambique (as of 2022); the group was responsible for orchestrating a series of large-scale and sophisticated attacks resulting in the capture of the port of Mocimboa da Praia, Cabo Delgado Province in August 2020, which it held for a year; in March 2021, it seized the northern Mozambican town of Palma (population 70,000), holding it for four days while killing dozens of civilians and security personnel; during the attack, the group targeted the local airfield, an army barracks, several banks, and a food storage warehouse; in 2021-2022, several African countries sent military troops to assist the Mozambique Government's efforts to defeat the group; these military operations have resulted in setbacks to ISIS-M, including considerable casualties and the destruction of some bases and training camps; nevertheless, the group continued to be active in 2023
goals: implement ISIS’s strict interpretation of sharia and establish an Islamic state
leadership and organization: led by Abu Yasir HASSAN; organizational information limited, but reportedly has regional commands; probably operates mostly in semi-autonomous cells that do not adhere to a strict hierarchical command structure, although the group has shown the ability to mass fighters for specific attacks (an estimated 200 fighters took part in the Palma attack)
areas of operation: northern Mozambique; primarily Cabo Delgado province, an area known for rich liquid natural gas deposits; has also conducted attacks in Nampula and Niassa provinces; has conducted cross-border attacks in Tanzania
targets, tactics, and weapons: has attacked army barracks, police stations, security checkpoints, government buildings, banks, and gas stations, and captured entire villages and towns; attacks are characterized by ambushes and direct assaults on government security forces and foreign private security contractors, murders of gas industry workers and contractors, indiscriminate killings of civilians, including women and children, beheadings, kidnappings, and looting and burning out villages; in April 2020, the group killed more than 50 young men in a village for reportedly resisting recruitment; has been accused of wholesale abductions of women and girls; armed with small arms, machine guns, improvised explosives, mortars, and rocket-propelled grenades (RPG); reportedly sank a government patrol boat with an RPG in 2020; has also used motorboats to conduct raids on coastal villages
strength: unclear; has reportedly incurred heavy casualties from multinational military operations; in 2023 was reportedly down to a few hundred fighters from an initial estimated strength of over 2,000; has received some foreign fighter support
financial and other support: unclear, although the group has targeted banks; the area’s natural resources, including gas, gems, timber, and wildlife present opportunities for fund-raising; in addition, the group has taken control of food supplies in areas under its control; weapons typically captured from government security forces
designation - placed on the US Department of State's list of Foreign Terrorist Organizations on 10 March 2021
Islamic State of Iraq and ash-Sham - Sinai Province (ISIS-SP)
aka: Islamic State-Sinai Province (IS-SP); ISIS-Sinai Province; ISIS-Sinai; ISIL Sinai Province (ISIL-SP); The State of Sinai; Wilayat Sinai; Islamic State in the Sinai; Ansar Bayt al-Maqdes; Ansar Beit al-Maqdis; Jamaat Ansar Beit al-Maqdis; Jamaat Ansar Beit al-Maqdis fi Sinaa; Ansar Jerusalem; Supporters of Jerusalem; Supporters of the Holy Place; Allies of the Holy House
history: began as Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis (ABM), which rose to prominence in 2011 following the uprisings in Egypt; ABM was responsible for attacks against Egyptian and Israeli government and security elements and against tourists in Egypt; in November 2014, ABM officially declared allegiance to ISIS; has since conducted a bloody insurgency against Egyptian security forces under the ISIS banner and become one of the most deadly of the ISIS affiliates; the Egyptian Government has deployed an estimated 40,000 troops and other security personnel to the Sinai to suppress the insurgency; as of 2023, the group continued to conduct attacks, although the scale of the insurgency had reportedly declined
goals: spread the Islamic caliphate by eliminating the Egyptian government, destroying Israel, and establishing an Islamic emirate in the Sinai
leadership and organization: current leader not available; reportedly has sections or branches for security, military affairs, bomb-making, and media operations
areas of operation: Egypt; operations are conducted primarily in the Sinai Peninsula, but its reach periodically extends to Cairo, the Egyptian Nile Valley, and Gaza
targets, tactics, and weapons: mainly targets Egyptian security forces, particularly checkpoints, convoys, and bases; conducts ambushes, assassinations, complex attacks involving dozens of attackers, car and suicide bombings, kidnappings, public executions, and road side bombings attacks; conducted large armed assaults on a military base in 2018 and on the Egyptian city of Sheikh Zuweid in 2014; both attacks included dozens of fighters with small arms, light and heavy machine guns, rocket-propelled grenades, mortars, car bombs, and suicide bombers; also targets Egyptian Government facilities and officials, oil pipelines and other infrastructure, tourists, religious minorities, government-allied tribes, places of worship, and airliners; two of its most deadly attacks were the 2017 assault by suicide bombers and gunmen on an Egyptian Sufi mosque that killed more than 300 and the 2015 bombing of a Russian airliner from the Egyptian resort town of Sharm el-el-Sheikh, which killed all 231 on board
strength: estimated in 2022 to have less than 1,000 fighters
financial and other support: receives funding from external actors, including core ISIS, and from smuggling; weapons reportedly are smuggled in from Gaza, Sudan, and Libya
designation: placed on the US Department of State's list of Foreign Terrorist Organizations on 9 April 2014
Islamic State of Iraq and ash-Sham - West Africa (ISIS-WA)
aka: Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP); Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant-West Africa (ISIL-WA); Islamic State of Iraq and Syria West Africa Province; ISIS West Africa Province; ISIS-West Africa (ISIS-WA); Wilayat Gharb Ifriqiyya
history: formed in 2015-2016 when a faction of Boko Haram broke off and pledged allegiance to ISIS; the split occurred primarily because of the indiscriminate violence Boko Haram inflicted on Muslims; since its founding, has waged an insurgency against the Nigerian Government, overrunning dozens of military bases and killing hundreds of soldiers; by 2019, reportedly controlled hundreds of square miles of territory in the Lake Chad region where it governed according to a strict interpretation of Islamic law and attempted to cultivate support among local civilians by focusing on filling gaps in governance; claimed additional attacks in 2021-2023, including an attack that killed more than 30 Nigerian soldiers in Borno State and an assault on a Cameroonian Army base; was engaged in fighting with Boko Haram and Nigerian security forces, as well as the militaries of the Multinational Joint Task Force (Benin, Cameroon, Chad, Niger, and Nigeria) through 2023; has reportedly far outstripped Boko Haram in size and capacity; between 2009 and 2023, jihadist violence associated with Boko Haram and more recently ISIS-WA has killed an estimated 35-40,000 people, mostly civilians, and displaced as many as 3 million persons
goals: implement ISIS’s strict interpretation of sharia and replace regional governments with an Islamic state
leadership and organization: leadership not available; organization also unclear; reportedly has a shura council and operational military commanders, but may have reorganized in 2021 into four regionally-based branches, representing Lake Chad, Tunbuna, Sambisa Forest, and Timbuktu; probably operates in small units and cells that mass for larger operations
areas of operation: Nigeria (primarily the northeast, but as of 2022 had reportedly spread to other regions of the country, including in and around the capital Abuja; greater Lake Chad region (including southeast Niger, northern Cameroon, and areas of Chad near Lake Chad)
targets, tactics, and weapons: seeks to de-legitimize the Nigerian Government by focusing its attacks on security forces, state-sponsored civilian defense groups, government targets, infrastructure, and individuals who collaborate with the government; attacks military bases and mobile columns; in 2018-2019, it overran more than 20 military bases in northeastern Nigeria, including one assault that resulted in the deaths of some 100 soldiers; in 2022, it claimed responsibility for an attack on a prison in Nigeria’s capital Abuja which freed nearly 900 inmates including 60 of its members; employs ambushes, complex ground assaults, hit-and-run attacks, targeted killings, road side bombs, and kidnappings of security forces personnel; has also conducted attacks against Boko Haram and engaged in the kidnapping and murder of aid workers and Christians, as well as civilians who aid the Nigerian military; fighters typically equipped with small arms, light and heavy machine guns, vehicle mounted weapons, rocket-propelled grenades, mines, rockets, improvised explosive devices, armored vehicles (including tanks), and unmanned aerial vehicles
strength: estimated in 2022 to have up to 5,000 active fighters
financial and other support: receives some funding from core ISIS and local sources, including kidnappings-for-ransom, taxation, and extortion practices; has captured a considerable number of vehicles, weapons, and ammunition from the Nigerian military; maintains training camps and has publicly advertised a “Caliphate Cadet School” featuring children between 8-16 years old undergoing indoctrination and military-style training
designation: placed on the US Department of State's list of Foreign Terrorist Organizations on 28 February 2018
Islamic State of Iraq and ash-Sham in Bangladesh (ISB)
aka: ISIS-Bangladesh, Caliphate in Bangladesh; Caliphate’s Soldiers in Bangladesh; Soldiers of the Caliphate in Bangladesh; Khalifa’s Soldiers in Bengal; Islamic State Bangladesh; Islamic State in Bangladesh; Islamic State in Bengal; Dawlatul Islam Bengal; ISIB; Abu Jandal al-Bangali; Jammat-ul Mujahadeen-Bangladesh; JMB; Neo-JMB; New JMB
history: formed in 2014-15 out of ISIS’s desire to expand to the Indian Subcontinent; consists of individuals who defected from Jamaat-ul-Mujahideen Bangladesh and Jund at-Tawhid wal-Khilafah and pledged allegiance to ISIS; has killed dozens in mostly smaller attacks, including a US citizen, and wounded more than 200 since its formation; active as of 2023
goals: protect Muslims in Bangladesh from perceived injustices and, ultimately, establish an Islamic caliphate in the Indian subcontinent
leadership and organization: led by Mahadi Hasan Jon; probably operates in a cell-based network
areas of operation: operates in major cities throughout Bangladesh
targets and tactics: primarily targets military and security personnel but also activists, bloggers, academics, religious minorities, and foreigners (particularly Westerners); has attacked restaurants, places of worship, government buildings, and crowds of civilians, typically with small arms, grenades, and improvised explosives devices, including suicide bombers; most deadly attack was a 2016 armed assault on a bakery in Dhaka, where the attackers used small arms, grenades, and machetes to kill 24 people
strength: at least several dozen members as of 2022
financial and other support: has received some support from ISIS; other funding sources not available
designation: placed on the US Department of State's list of Foreign Terrorist Organizations on 28 February 2018
Islamic State of Iraq and ash-Sham in Libya (ISIS-L)
aka: ISIS-Libya, Islamic State-Libya; IS-Libya; Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant in Libya (ISIL-L); Wilayat Barqa; Wilayat Fezzan; Wilayat Tripolitania; Wilayat Tarablus; Wilayat al-Tarabulus; Desert Army; Jaysh al-Sahraa
history: formed in 2014 when then ISIS leader Abu Bakr al-BAGHDADI dispatched operatives from Syria to establish a branch; claimed responsibility for its first operation, a suicide attack on a hotel in Tripoli, in January 2015; from 2015 to 2016, grew to as many as 6,000 fighters, established a stronghold in Sirte, and expanded operations into Libya’s oil producing region; from late 2016 to 2017, was driven from Sirte into the desert by Libyan forces, with assistance from the US military, while suffering heavy losses in personnel; since 2018, has altered its strategy to what it described as a nikayah (war of attrition) of guerrilla warfare and traditional terrorist tactics with small bands of fighters operating out of ungoverned spaces in Libya and conducting attacks throughout the country; claimed several small-scale attacks against local military and security services in 2020-2021 despite losses to government counterterrorism operations; although weakened, the group in 2023 retained some operational capability and was trying to reorganize and gain strength
goals: prevent the formation of a reunified Libyan state, secure control over the country’s oil resources and, ultimately, establish an Islamic caliphate in Libya
leadership and organization: Abdulsalam DARKULLAH; when ISIS-L held territory, its structure included three regionally-based provinces (wilayat) with defined state-like departments (diwans) and a hierarchal chain of command; fighters reportedly organized into cells of 30-40 fighters each
areas of operation: unable to control any population centers, but continues to have some mobile desert camps in rural central and southern Libya; assessed to retain an undetermined number of dormant cells in some coastal cities
targets, tactics, and weapons: targets military and security forces, oil infrastructure, and entities or individuals associated with Libya's competing governments; targets include oil facilities, security checkpoints and police stations, and symbolic state targets such as Libya’s electoral commission headquarters and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; also kidnaps local notables for potential prisoner exchanges or ransom; attacks typically are hit-and-run and conducted with small arms and suicide bombers; weapons mostly include small arms, rocket-propelled grenades, mortars, light and heavy machine guns, landmines, and improvised explosive devices
strength: estimated in 2023 to have up to a few hundred fighters, including foreign fighters from Ghana, Kenya, Niger, Nigeria, and Sudan
financial and other support: ISIS core has provided ad hoc financial support; additional funding comes from arms smuggling, taxes on illicit trade routes, kidnappings for ransom, and external sources, such as enterprises run by sympathizers, especially in western Libya; has acquired weapons through captured Libyan military stockpiles and smuggling networks
designation - placed on the US Department of State's list of Foreign Terrorist Organizations on 20 May 2016
Islamic State of Iraq and ash-Sham in the Greater Sahara (ISIS-GS)
aka: ISIS in the Greater Sahara; Islamic State in the Greater Sahel; Islamic State of the Greater Sahel or ISGS; Islamic State’s Sahel Province or ISSP; ISIS in the Islamic Sahel; ISIS in the Sahel or ISIS-Sahel
history: emerged in May 2015 when Adnan Abu Walid al-SAHRAWI and his followers split from the al-Qaida-affiliated group al-Murabitoun and pledged allegiance to ISIS; ISIS acknowledged the group in October 2016; has carried out attacks in the Sahel region, including one on a joint US-Nigerien military force operating near the Mali-Niger border in October 2017; since February 2018, has clashed repeatedly with French military forces and allied local militias operating under the French-sponsored counterterrorism operation known as Operation Barkhane, as well as Nigerien, Malian, and Burkinabe troops; for example, conducted attacks against Nigerien and Malian military bases in late 2019 that killed 89 and 54 soldiers, respectively; after a period of some reported cooperation, ISIS-GS has engaged in fighting in with the local al-Qa’ida-aligned coalition known as Jama'at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) over territory, including control of gold extraction areas and access to buyers, since 2020; as of 2023, it had gained strength and ground in Mali and northern Benin and was actively engaged in clashes with government security forces and JNIM
goals: replace regional governments with an Islamic state; reportedly has not developed a cohesive, ideologically driven narrative but instead tries to adapt its message to what can garner the most support from local communities
leadership and organization: Abba al-Saharawi (alt. al-Sahrawi); probably operates in small mobile, geographically dispersed cells or groups with varying levels of autonomy that consolidate for operations
areas of operation: mostly concentrated in the Mali-Niger border region but also operates in Burkina Faso and northern Benin
targets, tactics, and weapons: targets local military and security forces, foreign military forces (French, UN, US), ethnic groups, local government officials, humanitarian workers, and schools; since 2018, has forced the closure of an estimated 2,000 schools in the region with threats, attacks, and murders of teachers and administrators; employs insurgency-type tactics against military and security forces, including ambushes, targeted killings, hit-and-run attacks, mortar attacks, road side bombs, car and truck bombs, suicide bombers, and direct assaults; ISIS-GS fighters attacking Malian and Nigerien military bases in 2019 used assault rifles, light machine guns, motorcycles, trucks mounting machine guns (aka "technicals"), mortars, and suicide bombers
strength: estimated in 2022 to have up to 1,000 fighters
financial and other support: specific sources not available, but probably originates from smuggling activities, local donations and taxation, attacks on gold mines, kidnapping for ransom, theft, and from other groups operating in the region; most of its weapons probably originate from the black market or are captured after attacks on local security forces; has also engaged in the smuggling of weapons, mostly from facilitation networks in southern Libya
designation: placed on the US Department of State's list of Foreign Terrorist Organizations on 23 May 2018
Islamic State of Iraq and ash-Sham (ISIS)
aka: al-Qa’ida in Iraq; al-Qa’ida Group of Jihad in Iraq; al-Qa’ida Group of Jihad in the Land of the Two Rivers; al-Qa’ida in Mesopotamia; al-Qa’ida in the Land of the Two Rivers; al-Qa’ida of Jihad in Iraq; al-Qa’ida of Jihad Organization in the Land of the Two Rivers; al-Qa’ida of the Jihad in the Land of the Two Rivers; al-Tawhid; Jam’at al-Tawhid Wa’al-Jihad; Tanzeem Qa’idat al Jihad/Bilad al Raafidaini; Tanzim Qa’idat al-Jihad fi Bilad al-Rafidayn; The Monotheism and Jihad Group; The Organization Base of Jihad/Country of the Two Rivers; The Organization Base of Jihad/Mesopotamia; The Organization of al-Jihad’s Base in Iraq; The Organization of al-Jihad’s Base in the Land of the Two Rivers; The Organization of al-Jihad’s Base of Operations in Iraq; The Organization of al-Jihad’s Base of Operations in the Land of the Two Rivers; The Organization of Jihad’s Base in the Country of the Two Rivers; al-Zarqawi Network; Islamic State of Iraq; Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham; Islamic State of Iraq and Syria; ad-Dawla al-Islamiyya fi al-’Iraq wa-sh-Sham; Daesh; Dawla al Islamiya; Al-Furqan Establishment for Media Production; Islamic State; ISIL; ISIS; ISIS-Core; Amaq News Agency; Al Hayat Media Center; Al-Hayat Media Center; Al Hayat
history: formed in the 1990s under the name al-Tawhid wal-Jihad by Jordanian militant Abu Mus’ab al-ZARQAWI to oppose the presence of Western military forces in the Middle East and the West’s support for, and the existence of, Israel; in late 2004, ZARQAWI pledged allegiance to al-Qa’ida (AQ) and the group became known as al-Qa’ida in Iraq (AQI); ZARQAWI led AQI against US and Coalition Forces in Iraq until his death in June 2006; in October 2006, renamed itself the Islamic State in Iraq; in 2013, adopted the moniker ISIS to express regional ambitions and expanded operations to Syria where it established control of a large portion of eastern Syria; in June 2014, then ISIS leader Abu Bakr al-BAGHDADI declared a worldwide Islamic caliphate with its capital in Raqqa, Syria; by 2015, held an area in Iraq and Syria with an estimated population of between 8 and 12 million, including the Iraqi city of Mosul; imposed a brutal version of Islamic law in the areas under its control and became known for brutality against perceived enemies, including the murder of large numbers of civilians, its large contingent of foreign fighters, and a substantial social media presence; by the end of 2017, had lost control of its largest population centers in both Iraq and Syria, including Mosul and Raqqa, to US and allied military forces; lost its final piece of territory in Baghuz, Syria in March 2019; has since transitioned to an insurgency, reverting to guerrilla warfare and more traditional terrorist tactics, developing sleeper cells, and assimilating into the broader population in Iraq and Syria where it continued to maintain a considerable presence and conduct operations as of 2023
goals: replace the world order with a global Islamic state based in Iraq and Syria, expand its branches and networks globally, and rule according to ISIS’s strict interpretation of Islamic law; in Iraq and Syria, it seeks to reestablish itself as a viable insurgency that is capable of seizing and controlling territory
leadership and organization: Abu Hafs al-Hashimi al-Quraishi (likely a nom de guerre) named leader in 2023 after predecessor killed; the top leader (emir) and a senior shura council determine the group's strategic direction and appoints the heads of provinces (wilayat); an "appointed (or delegated) committee" and up to 14 sub-bureaus or offices (dawawin) are reportedly charged with administrative duties, including security, explosives manufacturing, finances, religious matters, recruitment, military operations, training and education, media functions, resources and plunder, etc.; the group typically operates in small cells or groups of 15 or fewer in Iraq and Syria, but can organize in greater numbers for specific operations; outside of Iraq and Syria, ISIS-Core has adopted a flatter, more networked and decentralized structure, giving greater operational autonomy to its external branches, networks, and claimed provinces; ISIS-Core has relied on its General Directorate of Provinces (GDP) offices to provide funding and operational guidance for these branches, networks, and provinces; GDP offices include: the al-Furqan Office (West Africa and the Sahel); the Dhu al-Nurayn Office (North Africa and Sudan); al-Karrar Office (East, Central, and Southern Africa, and Yemen regions); the Afghanistan-based al-Siddiq Office (South, Central, and Southeast Asia); and the Iraq-based Bilad al-Rafidayn Office
areas of operation: ISIS-Core operations remain predominately in Iraq and Syria; has designated Iraq as a separate province with its own leader; operational in the rural and desert areas of central and northern Iraq, primarily within and near Sunni populations with some presence in major population areas (mostly the provinces of Anbar, Ninewa, Kirkuk, Salah ad Din, and Diyala; maintained safehavens in isolated areas such as the Hamrin Mountains of Kirkuk and the deserts of Anbar); in Syria, it continued to operate mainly in the central desert and across northern and eastern provinces, while top leaders likely remained in the western Idlib governorate; oversees about 20 external branches, networks, or wilayat (provinces, governorates)in more than 20 countries: Algeria, Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, the Caucasus (Russia), Central Africa (the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Mozambique), East Asia (Philippines, Indonesia), Greater Sahara (tri-border area of Burkina Faso, Mali, Niger), India, Libya, Khorasan (Afghanistan), Pakistan, Palestine (Israel), the Sahel (Mali), Sinai Peninsula (Egypt), Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Tunisia, Turkey, West Africa (northeastern Nigeria, southeastern Niger, northern Cameroon, areas of Chad around Lake Chad), and Yemen; local terrorist groups in other countries, such as Lebanon and Sudan, have pledged allegiance to ISIS; has supporters, sympathizers, and associates worldwide and has inspired or conducted attacks in Australia, Belgium, France, Germany, Iran, Maldives, Russia, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Tajikistan, Turkey, the UK, and the US; authorities in other countries, including, but not exclusive to, Austria, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Greece, Israel, Italy, Jordan, Lebanon, Malaysia, and the Netherlands have arrested ISIS members or supporters or disrupted plots linked to ISIS; maintains a strong online presence and continuously calls for attacks against Western countries and their interests around the world; individuals inspired by its ideology may conduct operations without direction from the ISIS’s central leadership
targets, tactics, and weapons: targets governments or groups that oppose its hardline Islamist ideology, including military forces and security services, government officials, perceived Sunni rivals, Westerners, and religious and ethnic minorities; typically targets security forces in Iraq and Syria, as well as tribal and civic leaders and other symbols of government; has also targeted infrastructure in Iraq, such as electrical towers; known for indiscriminate killings, mass executions, political assassinations, torture, kidnappings, rape and sexual slavery, forced marriages and religious conversions, conscripting children, publishing videos of beheadings, and using civilians as human shields; has engaged in the systematic destruction of antiquities, places of worship, monasteries, and other elements of the cultural heritage of ancient communities; attacks places of worship, shopping centers and markets, tourist sites, hotels, concert venues, restaurants, train stations, nightclubs, government buildings, and infrastructure targets; attacks on civilians typically involve the use of small arms, vehicle bombs, explosive vests, and ramming vehicles into crowds of people; employs insurgent/guerrilla-style hit-and-run, and terrorist attacks against military and security forces that include the use of ambushes, snipers, complex ground/military assaults, mortar and rocket attacks, road side bombs, and suicide devices; possesses a wide variety of weapons, including small arms, light and heavy machine guns, rocket-propelled grenades, mortars, rockets, man-portable air defense systems (MANPADS), anti-tank guided missiles, and a variety of improvised explosive devices, including unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) armed with explosives
strength: estimated in 2023 to have 5,000 to 7,000 members and supporters across Iraq and Syria
note: as of 2023, there were about 11,000 ISIS prisoners in Syrian Democratic Forces prisons, including approximately 2,000 foreign terrorist fighters of around 70 nationalities
financial and other support: raises funds through ad hoc criminal activities, particularly kidnapping for ransom, smuggling, and extortion activities; also receives funds through private donations, crowd-sourcing, online humanitarian appeals, and investments in legitimate businesses; prior to 2019, received virtually of its funding from oil sales, taxation, and selling confiscated goods within areas it controlled in Iraq and Syria; the group currently holds no territory, which has significantly reduced its ability to generate, store, and transfer revenue, but it continues to draw on financial reserves accrued when it controlled territory (estimated in 2020 at more than $100 million); ISIS has armed itself with weapons it has captured, purchased through local arms trafficking networks, and produced on its own; also recruits members, supporters, and sympathizers online through social media platforms
designation: predecessor organization al-Qa'ida in Iraq (AQI) was placed on the US Department of State's list of Foreign Terrorist Organizations on 17 December 2004
Islamic State of Iraq and ash-Sham - note
self-proclaimed ISIS branches, networks, and provinces (non-FTO designated). This appendix provides short descriptions of identified or self-proclaimed ISIS branches, networks, and provinces that have not been designated by the US State Department as Foreign Terrorist Organizations
Islamic State of Iraq and ash-Sham: Algeria: the Islamic State declared the establishment of a province in Algeria (Wilayat al-Jazair) in November 2014; includes elements of a local terrorist organization known as Jund al-Khilafa; goal is to replace the Algerian Government with an Islamic state; targets security forces, local government figures, and Western interests; largely defunct due to heavy pressure from Algerian security forces, although ISIS core claimed responsibility for a February 2020 attack on a military base near the border with Mali; historically maintained an operational and recruitment presence mostly in the northeastern part of the country
Islamic State of Iraq and ash-Sham network in Azerbaijan: ISIS declared a new network in Azerbaijan in July of 2019, although it has not claimed responsibility for any attacks; additional details of the network unavailable
Islamic State of Iraq and ash-Sham: Caucasus Province: ISIS-Caucasus Province (ISIS-CP; aka Wilayat Qawqaz) was announced in June 2015; grew out of the former al-Qa’ida-affiliated Islamic Emirate of the Caucasus, which suffered from losses to Russian counterterrorism operations, leadership disputes, and defections to ISIS; claimed responsibility for its first attack against a Russian Army barracks in September 2015; claimed at least two attacks on local security forces in 2020, including a suicide bomber who blew himself up in the North Caucasus region of Karachay-Cherkessia, injuring six police officers; Russian security services conducted multiple operations against suspect ISIS militants in 2021; operates in the North Caucasus area of the Russian Federation between the Black Sea and Caspian Sea; typically conducts attacks against local security and military forces, as well as non-Muslim civilians, with small arms, improvised explosives, and knives
Islamic State of Iraq and ash-Sham: India: the Islamic State-India (aka ISI; Islamic State-Hind; Wilayah of Hind) was announced in May 2019 when ISIS claimed it had restructured the group’s Khorasan Province and created separate provinces for ISIS-affiliated elements operating in India and Pakistan; the announcement followed an attack claimed by ISIS on Indian security forces in India-administered Kashmir; ISIS-India is reportedly dominated by Kashmiri jihadists and has conducted several additional low-scale attacks targeting Indian security forces in Kashmir; estimated in 2021 to have less than 200 members, but was active in 2022, although its presence was largely online; ISIS-linked groups reportedly operating in India include Ansar-ut Tawhid fi Bilad al-Hind, Indian Mujahideen, and Junood-ul-Khilafa-Fil-Hind (aka Jundul Khilafa)
Islamic State of Iraq and ash-Sham: East Asia networks in Indonesia: comprises a loose network of ISIS affiliates, cells, and supporters throughout the country known as Jemaah Anshorut Daulau (JAD), which Aman ABDURRAHMAN (in prison) has led since 2015; goal is to replace the Indonesian Government with an Islamic state and implement ISIS’s interpretation of sharia; known for attacking security forces and Christians; in 2019, a JAD member attempted to assassinate Indonesia’s security minister and a local police chief; in 2018, staged simultaneous suicide bombings by families, including women and children, against three churches in Surabaya that killed more than 30 civilians; strength unknown, but maintains a clandestine operational presence across the country; local cells maintain their own structures and remain largely autonomous; JAD includes former members of the FTO-designated group Jemaah Ansharut Tauhid (JAT; aka Jemmah Ansharut Tauhid; Laskar 99), which disbanded in 2015 to join JAD (some members reportedly joined al-Qa'ida); has a relationship with the ISIS-affiliated East Indonesia Mujahideen (aka Mujahidin Indonesia Timor, or MIT), which Indonesian police linked to an assault on a village in Sulawesi in late 2020 that killed four; in 2021, Indonesian security forces disrupted planned attacks by JAD and killed the leader of MIT (Ali KALORA); in 2022, they arrested 15 members of the group; other ISIS-affiliated groups in Indonesia reportedly include Muhajirin Anshar Tauhid (MAT), Firqah Abu Hamzah (FAH), Jamaah Ansharul Khilafah (JAK), and some factions of Darul Islam/Negara Islam Indonesia (DI/NII)
Islamic State of Iraq and ash-Sham - Pakistan: ISIS announced in May 2019 that it restructured the group’s Khorasan Province and created separate provinces for ISIS-affiliates operating in Pakistan; operates mostly in Balochistan and northern Sindh provinces and chiefly targets non-Muslims and the local Shia population, particularly the Hazaras; claimed several attacks Baluchistan in 2020 and early 2021; ISIS has claimed additional attacks in Pakistan, including a March 2022 suicide bombing on a Shia mosque in Peshawar that killed 64, but it is unclear if the attack was carried out by the Pakistan branch or ISIS-Khorasan
Islamic State of Iraq and ash-Sham: Somalia: formed in 2015-2016; splinter group of al-Shabaab and reportedly founded by former al-Shabaab commander Abdulqadir MUMIN; estimated in 2023 to have less than 250 fighters; operates primarily in the remote mountains of the Bari area of the semi-autonomous Puntland region; targets Somali Government and security forces, Puntland security forces, African Union peacekeepers, and al-Shabaab elements through low-level attacks using small arms and improvised explosive devices, as well as targeted assassinations; continued to be active into 2023, but also reportedly has been weakened due to counterterrorism operations and clashes with the al-Shabaab terrorist group
Islamic State of Iraq and ash-Sham network in Tunisia: a network of cells, supporters, and Islamic militant groups in Tunisia claiming allegiance to ISIS, including Jund al-Kilafah (JAK or “Soldiers of the Caliphate”); goal is to replace the Tunisian Government with an Islamic state and implement ISIS’s strict interpretation of sharia; since 2015, it has conducted periodic attacks against security forces and tourist sites frequented by Westerners, such as a resort in Sousse and a museum in Tunis; attacks have included suicide bombings, improvised explosive devices mounted on motorcycles, stabbings, targeted assassinations, and bank robberies; sporadic attacks continued through 2020; claimed an attack in February 2021 that killed 4 soldiers; Tunisian security forces in 2022 claimed it had destroyed at least two terrorist cells linked to ISIS; the network is mostly active in the mountainous region along the border with Algeria, particularly the Chaambi Mountains near the city of Kasserine
Islamic State of Iraq and ash-Sham –Turkey: publicly announced in July 2019, when ISIS released a video of a group of fighters in Turkey pledging allegiance to then-ISIS leader al-BAGHDADI and declaring a new province (wilayat) in Turkey; the speaker threatened both Turkey and the US while the fighters in the video were armed with assault rifles, grenades, light machine guns, and rocket-propelled grenade launchers; ISIS has long had a presence in Turkey, which previously served as a transit point for foreign fighters traveling to Syria to join the self-declared Islamic State caliphate and participate in the civil war; prior to the declaration of a province in Turkey, the Turkish government suspected ISIS of responsibility for numerous attacks, including suicide bombings at Ataturk Airport in June 2016 and at a wedding in August 2016, as well as a shooting at a nightclub in January 2017 (the last major ISIS attack in Turkey as of 2022); since the collapse of the caliphate in early 2019, Turkey continues to be a regional transit hub for ISIS in its efforts to smuggle fighters, weapons, funding, and supplies into Syria; as of 2022, Turkish security forces continued to conduct counter-terrorism operations against ISIS and militants linked to the group
Islamic State of Iraq and ash-Sham - Yemen: publicly announced in April 2015 after a self-proclaimed ISIS affiliate calling itself “Wilayat Sana’a” claimed responsibility for a mosque bombing in Yemen that killed approximately 140 people; goal is to replace the Yemen Government and the Houthi rival government with an Islamic state and implement ISIS’s strict interpretation of sharia; since 2015, has carried out hundreds of attacks against Yemeni security forces, Yemeni Government facilities and personnel, Houthi forces, Shia Muslims, and al-Qa’ida; methods include suicide bombers, car/truck bombs, road side bombs, ambushes, armed ground assaults, kidnappings, and targeted assassinations; operational primarily in south and central Yemen; reportedly has suffered heavy losses in fighting with the local al-Qa'ida affiliate (al-Qa'ida in the Arabian Pensinsula) and Houthi forces; the group also suffered from internal disputes and a reported lack of leadership; as of 2023, it was considerably degraded in capabilities and strength (estimated to be about 100 fighters)
Islamic State of Iraq and ash-Sham-Khorasan Province (ISIS-K)aka: Islamic State of Iraq and Syria-Khorasan; Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant-Khurasan (ISIL-K); Islamic State Khurasan (IS, ISK, ISISK); Islamic State of Iraq and Levant in Khorasan Province (ISKP); Islamic State's Khorasan Province; ISIL-Khorasan; Wilayat al-Khorasan; Wilayat Khurasan; ISIL's South Asia Branch; South Asian Chapter of ISIL
history: formed in January 2015 primarily from former members of Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan, the Afghan Taliban, and the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan; ISIS appointed former Pakistani Taliban commander Hafiz Said KHAN as leader (later killed in a US military strike); frequently fought with the Afghan Taliban over control of territory and resources; also conducted an insurgency against the Afghan Government and foreign military forces; suffered heavy losses of fighters, leaders, and territory to Afghan and US counterterrorism operations, as well as to the Taliban, but retained the ability to orchestrate attacks, recruit, and replenish leadership positions; since the fall of the Afghan Government to the Taliban and the US/Coalition withdrawal in August 2021, has conducted dozens of attacks against the Taliban, including suicide bombings, assassinations, and ambushes on security checkpoints; in 2022, claimed a suicide bombing attack on a Shia mosque in Pakistan and a rocket attack on an Uzbek military border post; remained active into 2023 as one of ISIS's most lethal branches
goals: portrays itself as the primary rival to the Taliban and seeks to portray the Taliban as incapable of providing security in the country; also seeks to undermine the relationship between the Taliban and neighboring countries; ultimately seeks to establish an Islamic caliphate in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and parts of Central Asia, including Iran
leadership and organization: leadership unclear; Sanaullah GHAFARI (aka Shahab al-Muhajir) possibly killed in June 2023; operates in small cells; ISIS restructured the Khorasan Province in May 2019, when it announced the creation of separate provinces for India and Pakistan
areas of operation: Afghanistan and Pakistan; also has conducted attacks in Iran, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan (note - “Khorasan” is a historical region that encompassed northeastern Iran, southern Turkmenistan, and northern Afghanistan)
targets, tactics, and weapons: targets the Taliban, the Haqqani Network, Shia Muslims (particularly the Hazaras community), followers of Sufi Islam, and diplomatic and infrastructure targets; known for indiscriminate attacks against civilians in both Afghanistan and Pakistan; killed an estimated 1,200 Afghan and more than 300 Pakistani civilians in armed assaults, assassinations, executions, and suicide bombings between 2016 and 2019; targets included Shia religious sites, neighborhoods, and other gathering places, diplomatic facilities in Kabul, a voter registration center, a television station, a hospital, and an election rally; in August 2020, conducted a raid on an Afghan prison that killed or wounded 80 and freed up to 400 prisoners, including ISIS-K and Taliban loyalists; in August 2021, it conducted a bombing attack on the Kabul Airport that killed 13 US military personnel and 169 Afghan civilians; in 2022, claimed responsibility for a suicide bombing attack on a Shia mosque in Pakistan that killed 63 persons; employs insurgent-type tactics, including ambushes, assassinations, hit-and-run attacks/raids/military-style assaults, roadside bombings and other improvised explosive device (IEDs) operations, mortar/rocket attacks, suicide bombings, etc.; typically armed with small arms, light and heavy machine guns, mortars, rockets, and various IEDs, including car bombs, road side bombs, and suicide bombers
strength: 2023 estimates varied from 1,000 to as many as 6,000 members
financial and other support: receives periodic funding from ISIS; raises additional funds locally from commerce, donations, taxes, ransoms, and extortion practices on individuals and businesses
designation: placed on the US Department of State's list of Foreign Terrorist Organizations on 14 January 2016
Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM)
aka: the Army of Mohammed; Mohammed’s Army; Tehrik ul-Furqaan; Khuddam-ul-Islam; Khudamul Islam; Kuddam e Islami; Jaish-i-Mohammed
history: founded in 2000 by former senior Harakat ul-Mujahideen leader Masood AZHAR upon his release from prison in India in exchange for 155 hijacked Indian Airlines passengers that JeM operatives were holding hostage; has claimed responsibility for multiple attacks in India-administered Kashmir, India, and Pakistan; after 2008, fought US and Coalition forces in Afghanistan; maintains close relations with the Taliban and al-Qa’ida in Afghanistan; outlawed in Pakistan; has conducted several attacks against Indian security forces in Jammu and Kashmir since 2018, including a suicide bombing in the city of Pulwama that killed 40 security police in February 2019; remained active in 2022
goals: annex the Indian Union Territory of Jammu and Kashmir to Pakistan
leadership and organization: led by Maulana Mohammed Masood AZHAR Alvi (aka Wali Adam Isah), with his brother and deputy, Mufti Abdul Rauf AZHAR Alvi, as well as a seven-member executive committee
areas of operation: Afghanistan (maintained training camps there as of 2022), India (stages attacks in Indian Union Territory of Jammu and Kashmir), Pakistan
targets, tactics, and weapons: attacks Indian military, security, and government officials, personnel, bases, and buildings; periodically attacks Pakistani government and security personnel; attempted to assassinate former Pakistani President Pervez MUSHARRAF in 2003; has assaulted and kidnapped Christians and foreigners; typically employs small arms, grenades, mines, improvised explosive devices, suicide bombers, and car bombs
strength: estimated in 2021 to have several hundred fighters
financial and other support: to avoid asset seizures by the Pakistani Government, JEM since 2007 has withdrawn funds from bank accounts and invested in legal businesses, such as commodity trading, real estate, and the production of consumer goods; also collects funds through donation requests, sometimes using charitable causes to solicit donations
designation: placed on the US Department of State's list of Foreign Terrorist Organizations on 26 December 2001
Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM)
aka: Jamaat Nosrat al-Islam wal-Mouslimin; Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims; Group to Support Islam and Muslims; GSIM; GNIM; Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimeen
history: formed in 2017 when the Mali Branch of al-Qa’ida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), al-Murabitoun, Ansar al-Dine, and the Macina Liberation Front (FLM; aka Katiba Macina or Macina Battalion/Brigade) agreed to work together as a coalition; describes itself as al-Qa’ida’s official branch in Mali and has pledged allegiance to al-Qa’ida leader Ayman al-ZAWAHIRI and deceased AQIM emir Abdelmalek DROUKDEL; has conducted hundreds of attacks against local and international security troops, vowing to take “combat action against security forces, rather than attacks on the population” to preserve relations with local communities; has tried to displace the authority of local governments in the areas where it operates, including providing services through its own self-described non-profit organizations, conflict arbitration, policing, and community dispute resolution; after a period of some reported cooperation, JNIM and the Islamic State of Iraq and ash-Sham in the Greater Sahara (ISIS-GS) elements have fought each other over territory in the region; the group continued to conduct attacks in 2023 and is one of al-Qa'ida's most active affiliates
goals: unite all terrorist groups in the Sahel, eliminate Western influence in the region, force out all French and other international military forces, and establish an Islamic state centered on Mali
leadership and organization: led by Iyad ag GHALI (also the leader of Ansar al-Dine); JNIM portrays itself as broad alliance of jihadist groups; in recent years, it reportedly has developed from a loose coalition to a more developed formal structure with centralized leadership, regional commanders, and local commanders; has a dedicated media unit known as az-Zalaqah; coalition members and affiliates (such as Ansarul Islam) reportedly maintain their existing leadership and organizational structures; for example, the Macina Brigade (aka Katiba Macina), which may be JNIM's most important coalition member, has a decentralized chain of command with sub-units known as markaz (“centre”), each of which has a leader (amirou markaz), assisted by a military commander and an advisory shura council; each markaz exercises considerable local autonomy; some fighters are organized into battalions (katibas)
areas of operation: predominantly active in Mali but also conducts operations in Burkina Faso and Niger; stronghold is in northern and central Mali, although it has conducted operations and attacks over most of the country and has expanded its presence in Burkina Faso; groups affiliated with the coalition have conducted attacks in Benin, Cote d'Ivoire, and Togo
targets, tactics, and weapons: targets international, regional, and local forces, as well as various non-state armed groups, including pro-government militias and rival jihadist militants such as Islamic State (ISIS) affiliates; typically employs insurgent-type tactics, including hit and run attacks/raids, kidnappings, ambushes, improvised explosive devises, road-side bombings, and mortar attacks; has attacked military bases and outposts, security checkpoints, patrols, and convoys, as well as the French embassy in Burkina Faso with small arms, machine guns, rocket-propelled grenades, mortars, rockets, suicide bombers, and car bombs; also targets other symbols of the government’s authority, including local leaders, civil servants, schools, teachers, and infrastructure, such as bridges, as well as foreign tourists with threats, assassinations, kidnappings, and bombings; in 2020, it murdered a European hostage held since 2016
strength: assessed in 2023 to have several thousand fighters
financial and other support: receives funding through kidnappings-for-ransom and extortion, and from smugglers who pay a tax in exchange for safe transit through JNIM-controlled trafficking routes in Mali; has attacked gold mines in areas outside government control and used the profits to recruit new members and buy weapons; equipped with arms captured from local military forces and smuggled in from Libya
designation: placed on the US Department of State's list of Foreign Terrorist Organizations on 6 September 2018
Jama’atu Ansarul Muslimina Fi Biladis-Sudan (Ansaru)
aka: Ansarul Muslimina Fi Biladis Sudan; Vanguards for the Protection of Muslims in Black Africa; JAMBS; Jama’atu Ansaril Muslimina Fi Biladis Sudan
history: formed in January 2012 as a breakaway faction of Boko Haram in the aftermath of a January 2012 Boko Haram attack in the city of Kano, Nigeria, that resulted in the deaths of at least 180 people, mostly Muslims; the Ansaru faction objected to Boko Haram’s attacks on fellow Muslims and killing non-Muslims who posed no threat to Muslims; claimed a kidnapping in 2013 and did not claim any further attacks until claiming responsibility for several in 2020, including two attacks on the Nigerian Army that resulted in the deaths of more than 60 Nigerian soldiers; the group announced its reemergence in late 2019; in January 2022, the group publicly announced that it had pledged loyalty to al-Qa'ida elements operating in the Sahel; active in 2023
goals: defend Muslims throughout Africa by fighting against the Nigerian Government and international interests; rid Nigeria of Western influence and establish an Islamic state in Nigeria
leadership and organization: reportedly led by Abu Usama ANSARI; previously was under Khalid al-BARNAWI until he was captured by the Nigerian Army in 2016; leads through a shura, but information on the group’s organizational structure is otherwise not available; announced the creation of a new media outlet for the group in 2019 (Al Yaqut Media Center)
areas of operation: operates in the northwest and north central regions of Nigeria, particularly Kaduna State, including the Benin-Niger-Nigeria tri-border area; also has reportedly taken part in al-Qa'ida operations in the Sahel
targets, tactics, and weapons: targets Nigerian Government officials and security/military forces; also kidnaps and kills foreigners, especially Westerners and abducts individuals with ties to potential ransom payers; uses small arms, light weapons, and explosives to carry out coordinated attacks, including ambushes and hit-and-run assaults; reportedly cooperating with some armed gangs operating in northwest Nigeria, including providing weapons
strength: not available; has reportedly absorbed an undetermined number of former Boko Haram fighters
financial and other support: unclear, although some funding probably is generated from kidnappings for ransom; the group reportedly received training and weapons from al-Qa’ida elements in Mali, as well as arms from smugglers operating in the Sahel
designation: placed on the US Department of State's list of Foreign Terrorist Organizations on 14 November 2013
Jaysh al Adl (Jundallah)
aka: Jeysh al-adl, Army of Justice; Jaish ul-Adl, Jaish al-Adl, Jaish Aladl, Jeish al-Adl; Jundullah; Jondullah; Jundollah; Jondollah; Jondallah; Army of God (God’s Army); Baloch Peoples Resistance Movement (BPRM); People’s Resistance Movement of Iran (PMRI); Jonbesh-i Moqavemat-i-Mardom-i Iran; Popular Resistance Movement of Iran; Soldiers of God; Fedayeen-e-Islam; Former Jundallah of Iran
history: formed in 2002 under the name Jundallah as an anti-Iranian Sunni Muslim armed group; founder and then-leader Abdulmalik RIGI was captured and executed by Iranian authorities in 2010; has engaged in numerous attacks on Iranian civilians, government officials, and security personnel; adopted the name Jaysh al Adl in 2012 and has since claimed responsibility for attacks under that name; continued to be active in 2022
goals: stated goals are to secure recognition of Balochi cultural, economic, and political rights from the Iranian government; procure greater autonomy for Balochis in Iran and Pakistan
leadership and organization: not available; reportedly has branches based on regions of Iran and Pakistan where it is active; probably organized into cells; operates a media outlet known as the Telegram Channel
areas of operation: Afghanistan, Iran, and Pakistan; operates primarily in the province of Sistan va Baluchestan of southeastern Iran and the Baloch areas of Afghanistan and Pakistan (outlawed in Pakistan since January 2017); note: the Sistan-Baluchestan province is home to a large community of minority Sunni Muslims who complain of discrimination in Shia-dominated Iran
targets, tactics, and weapons: primarily targets Iranian security forces but also government officials and Shia civilians; attacks include hit-and-run raids, assaults, ambushes, kidnappings, assassinations, suicide bombings, and car bombings; has conducted several ambushes of Iranian security forces near the Pakistan border in recent years; one of its recent most deadly attacks was a February 2019 suicide car bombing of a bus carrying Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) personnel that killed 27; weapons include small arms, light weapons, and various improvised explosive devices such as suicide vests and car bombs
strength: limited, dated, and widely varied estimates range from a few hundred up to as many as 2,000 members
financial and other support: not available
designation: placed on the US Department of State's list of Foreign Terrorist Organizations on 4 November 2010
Jaysh Rijal al-Tariq al Naqshabandi (JRTN)
aka: Jaysh Rijal al-Tariq al-Naqshabandi; Army of the Men of the Naqshbandi Order; Armed Men of the Naqshabandi Order; Naqshbandi Army; Naqshabandi Army; Men of the Army of al-Naqshbandia Way; Jaysh Rajal al-Tariqah al-Naqshbandia; JRTN; JRN; AMNO
history: emerged in December 2006 as an Arab secular Ba'athist nationalistic armed group in response to SADDAM Husayn's execution; consisted largely of Iraqi Sunni Muslims following Naqshabandi Sufi Islam ideals; between 2006 and the 2011 withdrawal of US forces from Iraq, claimed responsibility for numerous attacks on US bases and personnel; in 2014, elements joined forces with ISIS in opposition to the Iraqi government and assisted with the taking of Mosul, but fissures later emerged between the two factions; some elements splintered off, but the majority of JRTN was subsumed by ISIS; current status unavailable; has not claimed responsibility for any attacks since 2016
goals: end external influence in Iraq and, ultimately, overthrow the Iraqi Government to install a secular Ba'athist state within the internationally recognized borders of Iraq
leadership and organization: Izzat Ibrahim al-DOURI, former vice president of SADDAM Husayn's Revolutionary Council, led JRTN with former Ba'ath Party officials and military personnel under SADDAM; information on the organization not available
areas of operation: Iraq; historically had a heavy presence in Salah ad Din, Ninawa, Tikrit, Kirkuk, Mosul, and Al Hawija regions and in the north
strength: not available
targets, tactics, and weapons: targeted Iraqi Government military and security forces and Iraqi Kurds who belong to any of the separatist Kurdish groups; also targeted US military personnel from 2006 to 2011; used small arms, light and heavy machine guns, artillery rockets, various improvised explosive devices, including road side and vehicle-borne bombs
financial resources: received funding from former members of the SADDAM regime, major tribal figures in Iraq, and contributions from Gulf-based sympathizers
designation - placed on the US Department of State's list of Foreign Terrorist Organizations on 30 September 2015
Jemaah Islamiya (JI)
aka: Jemaa Islamiyah, Jema'a Islamiyah, Jemaa Islamiyya, Jema'a Islamiyya, Jemaa Islamiyyah, Jema'a Islamiyyah, Jemaah Islamiah, Jema'ah Islamiyah, Jemaah Islamiyyah, Jema'ah Islamiyyah, Jama'a Assalafiyah Lidda'wa Wal Jihad, Islamic Congregation, Salafi Group for Call and Holy War, Jemaah Islamia, al-Qa’ida Indonesia
history: has roots in the Darul Islam movement that emerged in Indonesia in the 1940s to resist the country’s post-colonial government, which it viewed as too secular; JI’s earliest efforts to organize date back to the late 1960s and early 1970 under co-founders Abu Bukar BA'ASYIR and Abdullah SUNGKAR; sent fighters to Afghanistan in the 1980s during the war with the Soviets to train; gained international notoriety in 2002 for the suicide bombing of a nightclub on the resort island of Bali that killed more than 200 people; outlawed by the Indonesian Government in 2007; since 2002 and into 2022, Indonesian authorities have killed or captured several hundred JI operatives, including several senior leaders; remains active in recruiting and cultivating support through religious boarding schools, mosques, print publications, the internet, media outlets, and charitable organizations that are fronts for the organization; trying to use political influence to press for Islamic law in Indonesia while clandestinely building a paramilitary force; has sent fighters to Iraq, the Philippines, and Syria for training and battlefield experience; affiliated with al-Qa’ida and has ties with the Abu Sayaf Group in the Philippines; Indonesian security forces captured stockpiles of weapons and ammunition and broke up a training camp in 2021; has not claimed responsibility for any attacks since 2016, but was active in 2022 and reportedly attempting to regain momentum while the Indonesian Government continued to conduct law enforcement and counter-terrorism operations against the group
goals: stated goal is to create an Islamic state comprising Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, and the southern Philippines
leadership and organization: current leadership not available; has a shura council, a paramilitary wing, and regional units known as mantiqi, which are responsible for administration and operations; each mantiqi is divided into smaller districts known as wakalah
areas of operation: operates throughout Indonesia; reportedly strongest in Java; has operated in the Philippines, Malaysia, and Singapore
targets, tactics, and weapons: targets Christians and Western interests, particularly tourist sites such as nightclubs and hotels; the majority of its victims have been civilians; attackers historically used small arms and improvised explosive devices, including car bombs and suicide vests
strength: estimated in 2022 to have up to 6,000 members
financial and other support: fundraises through membership donations and criminal and business activities, including cultivating palm oil plantations; has received financial, ideological, and logistical support from Middle Eastern contacts and Islamic charities and organizations; collects cash remittances from Indonesians abroad; members have received weapons and explosives training in Afghanistan, Iraq, Pakistan, the Philippines, and Syria
designation: placed on the US Department of State's list of Foreign Terrorist Organizations on 23 October 2002
Kata'ib Hizballah (KH)
aka: Hizballah Brigades; Hizballah Brigades in Iraq; Hizballah Brigades-Iraq; Kata’ib Hezbollah; Khata’ib Hezbollah; Khata’ib Hizballah; Khattab Hezballah; Hizballah Brigades-Iraq of the Islamic Resistance in Iraq; Islamic Resistance in Iraq; Kata’ib Hizballah Fi al-Iraq; Katibat Abu Fathel al-A’abas; Katibat Zayd Ebin Ali; Katibut Karbalah; Brigades (or Battalions) of the Party of God
history: formed in 2007 from several predecessor networks and former members of the Badr Organization as an Iraqi Shia militia and political organization; fought against US and Coalition forces from 2007 to 2011 and earned a reputation for conducting lethal bombing and rocket attacks; sent fighters to Syria to fight alongside Lebanese Hizballah and Syrian government forces beginning in 2012; fought in Iraq against the Islamic State of Iraq and ash-Sham (ISIS) as a member of the Popular Mobilization Committee and Affiliated Forces (PMC or PMF), an umbrella group of mostly Shia militia groups; was accused of extrajudicial killings and abductions of Iraqi Sunni Muslims during this period; in 2018, its affiliated political party (Independent Popular Gathering) joined the Al Fatah (Victory) Alliance, a political coalition primarily comprised of parties affiliated with Iranian-backed Shia militias; in 2019 and early 2020, conducted several attacks against US military bases and participated in an assault on the US Embassy in Baghdad; also involved in attacking and abducting anti-government protesters in Baghdad; has continued to be active through 2023, including attacks on US forces; typically uses front names or proxy groups to obfuscate its involvement in attacks; has strong ties to the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and recognizes Ayatollah KHAMENEI, the Supreme Leader of Iran, as its spiritual leader
goals: overthrow the Iraqi Government to install a government based on Shia Muslim laws and precepts; eliminate US influence in Iraq
leadership and organization: led by a shura council, with individuals reportedly selected by the IRGC; secretary general of the council is Ahmad Mohsen Faraj al-HAMIDAWI (aka Abu Hussein, Abu Zalata, Abu Zeid); shura council members are responsible for special military operations, military/paramilitary forces, funding and logistics, civil affairs, media, social/cultural affairs, and administration; KH fighters comprise three brigades of the PMC's paramilitary forces (aka Popular Mobilization Forces, PMF), the 45th, 46th, and 47th; has a political party created in 2021 called Huqooq (Rights) Movement
areas of operation: headquartered in Baghdad; also active in Ninawa, Al Anbar, Babil, and throughout Iraq’s southern governorates, including Al Basrah, Maysan, Dhi Qar, and Wasit; has participated in the Syrian civil war since 2012 (remained active in Syria in 2022)
targets, tactics, and weapons: targets ISIS fighters, Sunni Muslim civilians, rival Shia factions, and US personnel and interests; employs both guerrilla-style and terrorist tactics, including hit-and-run assaults, ambushes, mortar and rocket attacks, roadside bombs, car bombs, targeted killings/assassinations, sniping, and abductions; has been accused of torturing and executing Sunni civilians, as well as looting and burning Sunni homes; fighters are equipped with small arms, machine guns, rockets (including large-caliber, up to 240mm), mortars, man-portable air defense systems (MANPADs), improvised explosive devices, rocket-propelled grenades, anti-aircraft guns, artillery, recoilless rifles, light tactical vehicles (Humvees), truck-mounted weapons (aka “technicals”), armed unmanned aerial vehicles (aka drones), and armored vehicles; reportedly has been involved in the training of Shia militants in other Gulf countries
strength: estimated in 2023 to have as many as 30,000 members
financial and other support: receives funding, logistical support, intelligence, training, and weapons from the IRGC-Qods Force and Lebanese Hizballah; solicits donations online and through a pro-Iran television channel; also raises funds through criminal activities, including kidnappings-for-ransom, smuggling, and taxing/extortion of activities in areas where the group is dominant; it also has legitimate business enterprises, such as property holdings and investments
designation: placed on the US Department of State's list of Foreign Terrorist Organizations on 2 July 2009
Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK)
aka: Kongra-Gel; the Kurdistan Freedom and Democracy Congress; the Freedom and Democracy Congress of Kurdistan; KADEK; Partiya Karkeran Kurdistan; the People’s Defense Force; Halu Mesru Savunma Kuvveti; Kurdistan People’s Congress; People’s Congress of Kurdistan; KONGRAGEL, KGK
history: founded by Abdullah OCALAN in 1978 as a Marxist-Leninist separatist organization comprised primarily of Turkish Kurds; launched a rural campaign of violence in 1984 which expanded to include urban terrorism in the early 1990s; fighting with Turkish security forces peaked in the mid-1990s with an estimated 40,000 casualties, the destruction of thousands of villages in the largely Kurdish southeast and east of Turkey, and the displacement of hundreds of thousands of Kurds; following his capture in 1999, OCALAN ordered members to refrain from violence and requested dialogue with the Turkish government; PKK foreswore violence until June 2004, when its militant wing took control, renounced the self-imposed cease-fire, and began conducting attacks from bases within Iraq; in 2009, the Turkish Government and the PKK resumed peace negotiations, but talks broke down after the PKK carried out an attack in July 2011 that left 13 Turkish soldiers dead; between 2012 and 2015, negotiations resumed but ultimately broke down owing partly to domestic political pressures and the war in Syria; since 2015, continued attacks and clashes with Turkish security forces have killed more than 3,000 PKK fighters, security forces, and civilians; the group was active as of 2023
goals: advance Kurdish autonomy, political, and cultural rights in Turkey, Iran, Iraq, and Syria, and ultimately, establish an independent Kurdish state centered in southeastern Turkey
leadership and organization: OCALAN, currently serving life imprisonment in Turkey, is still the group's leader and figurehead, but day-to-day affairs and operations are run by Murat KARAYILAN and a three-man Executive Committee; the armed wing of the PKK is called the People's Defense Force
areas of operation: located primarily in northern Iraq (headquartered in the Qandil Mountains) and southeastern Turkey; affiliated groups operate in northwestern Syria, as well as in Iran
targets, tactics, and weapons: primarily attacks Turkish government personnel and security forces, including military patrols, convoys, security checkpoints, police stations, and government buildings; uses a mixture of guerrilla warfare and terrorist tactics, including armed assaults, hit-and-run attacks, kidnappings, grenade attacks, car bombs, remotely-detonated improvised explosive devices (IEDs), unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) mounting IEDs, and suicide bombers; weapons include small arms, machine guns, grenades, mortars, man-portable air defense systems (MANPADs), UAVs, and various improvised explosive devices
strength: estimated in 2021 to have 4,000-5,000 members
financial and other support: receives logistical and financial support from a large number of sympathizers among the Kurdish community in southeast Turkey, Syria, Iraq, and Iran, as well as the large Kurdish diaspora in Europe; additional sources of funding include criminal activity, such as narcotics smuggling and extortion
designation: placed on the US Department of State's list of Foreign Terrorist Organizations on 8 October 1997
Lashkar i Jhangvi (LJ)
aka: Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ), Lashkar-i-Jhangvi, Lashkar Jangvi, Army of Jhangvi, Lashkar e Jhangvi al-Almi, LeJ al-Alami, Usman Saifullah group
history: formed around 1996 as a terrorist offshoot of the Sunni Deobandi sectarian group Sipah-i-Sahaba Pakistan; banned by the Pakistani Goverment in August 2001 as part of an effort to rein in sectarian violence, causing many LJ members to seek refuge in Afghanistan with the Taliban, with whom the group had existing ties; after the collapse of the Taliban in Afghanistan, members became active in aiding other terrorists, providing them with safe houses, false identities, and protection in Pakistani cities; linked to al-Qa’ida and Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan (TTP), and reportedly cooperated with the Islamic State in a 2016 attack against a police training college in Quetta, Pakistan that killed more than 60; since 2017, has lost several senior leaders to Pakistani counter-terrorism operations and has not claimed responsibility for any attacks; in mid-2020, the group reportedly pledged allegiance to TTP under the name Usman Saifullah; active in 2022
goals: exterminate Shia Muslims and religious minorities; rid the region of Western influence and, ultimately, establish an Islamic state under sharia in Pakistan
leadership and organization: leadership not available; crackdowns by Pakistani security forces has reportedly fractured and decentralized the organization, leading to independent cells and factions
areas of operation: based primarily in Pakistan’s Punjab province, the Federally Administered Tribal Areas, Karachi, and Balochistan; has carried out attacks in both Afghanistan and Pakistan
targets, tactics, and weapons: most known for violent attacks against Shia Muslims; also targets Sufi Muslims, non-Muslims, and Westerners; has attacked buses, markets, mosques, political rallies, and other venues where Shia Muslims congregate, as well as churches and hotels; attacks on Pakistani officials and security personnel have included targeted killings (including an attempted assassination of the Pakistani prime minister in 1999), ambushes, suicide bombings, and vehicle bombings, including exploding a water tanker filled with explosives that killed or wounded more than 250 in Baluchistan, Pakistan, in 2013; operatives typically armed with small arms and light weapons, grenades, improvised explosive devices, and suicide vests
strength: assessed in 2021 to have a few hundred members
financial and other support: funding comes from donors in Pakistan and the Middle East, particularly Saudi Arabia; engages in criminal activity, including extortion
designation: placed on the US Department of State's list of Foreign Terrorist Organizations on 30 January 2003
Lashkar-e Tayyiba (LeT)
aka: Jamaat-ud-Dawa, JuD; Lashkar-i-Taiba; al Mansooreen; Al Mansoorian; Army of the Pure; Army of the Pure and Righteous; Army of the Righteous; Lashkar e-Toiba; Paasban-e-Ahle-Hadis; Paasban-e-Kashmir; Paasban-i-Ahle-Hadith; Pasban-e-Ahle-Hadith; Pasban-e-Kashmir; Jama’at al-Dawa; Jamaat ud-Daawa; Jamaat ul-Dawah; Jamaat-ul-Dawa; Jama’at-i-Dawat; Jamaiat-ud-Dawa; Jama’at-ud-Da’awah; Jama’at-ud-Da’awa; Jamaati-ud-Dawa; Idara Khidmate-Khalq; Falah-i-Insaniat Foundation; FiF; Falah-e-Insaniat Foundation; FalaheInsaniyat; Falah-i-Insaniyat; Falah Insania; Welfare of Humanity; Humanitarian Welfare Foundation; Human Welfare Foundation; Al-Anfal Trust; Tehrik-e-Hurmat-e-Rasool; TehrikeTahafuz Qibla Awwal; Al-Muhammadia Students; Al-Muhammadia Students Pakistan; AMS; Tehreek-e-Azadi-e-Kashmir; Kashmir Freedom Movement; Tehreek Azadi Jammu and Kashmir; Tehreek-e-Azadi Jammu and Kashmir; TAJK; Movement for Freedom of Kashmir; Tehrik-i-Azadi-i Kashmir; Tehreek-e-Azadi-e-Kashmir; TEK; Kashmir Freedom Movement ;Milli Muslim League; Milli Muslim League Pakistan; MML
history: formed in the late 1980s as the armed wing of Markaz ud Dawa ul-Irshad (MDI), a Pakistan-based extremist organization and charity originally formed to oppose the Soviet presence in Afghanistan; began attacking Indian troops and civilian targets in the state of Jammu and Kashmir in 1993; often operates under the guise of its charitable affiliates and other front organizations to avoid sanctions; combines with other groups like Jaish-e-Muhammad and Hizbul Mujahideen to mount anti-India attacks; linked to al-Qa’ida and has reportedly provided refuge and training to al-Qa’ida members in Pakistan; provided support to the Afghan Taliban prior to the Taliban takeover in 2021; continues to be active although the group has been banned in Pakistan and has faced pressure from the Pakistan Government to give up arms and integrate into Pakistan society
goals: annex the Indian Union Territory of Jammu and Kashmir to Pakistan and foment an Islamic insurgency in India; oust Western and Indian influence in Afghanistan; enhance its recruitment networks and paramilitary training in South Asia; and, ultimately, install Islamic rule throughout South Asia
leadership and organization: led by Hafiz Mohammad SAEED (currently imprisoned in Pakistan); has a robust infrastructure in Pakistan with district offices and departments (or wings) overseeing finances, charities, politics/government, foreign affairs, media and propaganda, social welfare programs, military operations (reportedly includes air and naval components), external affairs, education/students, ulema (clerics), and the building of mosques and madrassas; has zone/regional commanders; typically conducts military/terrorist operations in cells; activities are coordinated through numerous front organizations, including charities; set up a political party, the Milli Muslim League, in 2017
areas of operation: operational presence throughout Pakistan but concentrated in Azad Kashmir, Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa, and Punjab provinces, where it maintains paramilitary training camps, medical clinics, and schools; active in both the Pakistan-administered and Indian-administered Kashmir region, as well as other parts of India, including major cities such as Bangalore, Hyderabad, Mumbai, and New Delhi; also active in Afghanistan, including training camps; has global connections and a strong operational network throughout South Asia
targets, tactics, and weapons: primarily focuses on Indian military and security, government, and civilian targets; has participated in attacks against Western interests in Afghanistan and called for the killing of non-Muslims and Westerners worldwide; typical attacks include hit-and-run raids, ambushes, grenade attacks, and bombings; most notorious attack was the November 2008 operation against two luxury hotels, a Jewish center, a train station, and a café in Mumbai, India that killed 166 people, including six Americans, and injured more than 300; attack was carried out by 10 gunmen armed with automatic weapons and grenades; operatives usually armed with assault rifles, machine guns, landmines, mortars, explosives, IEDs, and grenades, including rocket-propelled grenades
strength: estimated in 2022 to have up to 5,000 members
financial and other support: collects donations in Pakistan and the Gulf, as well as from other donors in the Middle East and the West; raises funds in Pakistan through charities, legitimate businesses, farming, and taxation; focuses recruitment on Pakistani nationals, but also recruits internationally
designation: placed on the US Department of State's list of Foreign Terrorist Organizations on 26 December 2001
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE)
aka: Ellalan Force, Tamil Tigers
history: formed circa 1975 and began an armed campaign against the Sri Lankan government to establish a Tamil homeland in 1983; started out as a guerrilla force but developed considerable conventional military capabilities, including air, artillery, and naval; employed an integrated insurgent strategy targeting primarily Sri Lanka's key installations and senior political and military leaders; established and administered a de facto state (Tamil Eelam) with Kilinochchi as its administrative capital; provided state functions such as courts, a police force, a bank, a radio station (Voice of Tigers), a television station (National Television of Tamil Eelam), and boards for humanitarian assistance, health, and education; from 1983 until 2009, fighting between government forces and LTTE resulted in 300,000 internally displaced persons, a million Tamils leaving the country, and as many as 100,000 deaths; in early 2009, Sri Lankan forces captured the LTTE’s key strongholds, including Kilinochchi, defeated the last LTTE fighting forces, killed its leader Velupillai PRABHAKARN, and declared military victory; approximately 12,000 members surrendered to Sri Lankan forces; LTTE has maintained an international network of sympathizers and financial support since its military defeat; supporters continued to be still active in 2022, although the last fatality inflicted on Sri Lankan security forces was in 2014
goals: revive the movement to establish a Tamil homeland
leadership and organization: current leadership not available; previous structure included a central governing committee led by PRABHAKARAN that oversaw all LTTE activities; organization had political and military wings, as well as a women's wing; military was divided into conventionally organized brigades and regiments of infantry, artillery, air defense, anti-tank, mortars, and security forces; also included special units for naval (Sea Tigers), air (Air Tigers), and intelligence capabilities, as well as a unit of suicide bombers (Black Tigers)
areas of operation: was based in the northeastern part of Sri Lanka; since its defeat, supporters have been active in India, Malaysia, and Sri Lanka
targets, tactics, and weapons: targeted Sri Lankan Government, political, and security officials, and military forces, as well as transportation nodes and infrastructure; carried out a sustained military campaign against Sri Lankan military and security forces; employed a mix of conventional, guerrilla, and terrorist tactics, including ground assaults and numerous assassinations and suicide bombings; forces were armed with a variety of weapons, including small arms, machine guns, rocket-propelled grenades, anti-aircraft guns, anti-tank weapons, mortars, artillery, explosives, small naval craft, and light aircraft
strength: not available
financial and other support: financial network of support continued after the group’s military defeat in 2009; employs charities as fronts to collect and divert funds for its activities
designation: placed on the US Department of State's list of Foreign Terrorist Organizations on 8 October 1997
National Liberation Armyaka - Ejercito de Liberacion Nacional; ELN
history: Colombian Marxist-Leninist group formed in 1964; reached its peak in the late 1990s, then suffered a marked period of decline, where it suffered from internal conflict and losses to both the Colombian security services and paramilitary forces that targeted leftist guerrilla groups; engaged in periodic negotiations with the Colombian Government throughout the 2000s and early 2010s while continuing to conduct attacks against security forces and the country’s economic infrastructure; formal talks were started again in 2017 and continued into 2018; however, the government suspended the talks indefinitely following a January 2019 ELN car bomb attack on the National Police Academy in Bogota that killed 21 and wounded 68; has expanded its presence into some areas left by the FARC following that group's peace agreement with the Colombian Government in 2016, as well as neighboring Venezuela in order to escape Colombian security forces and exploit opportunities for illicit financing and recruitment; was also engaged in periodic fighting with FARC dissidents and other criminal groups over territory and drug trafficking routes, particularly near the Colombia-Venezuela border; in June 2023, the group signed a 6-month cease-fire with the Colombian Government
goals: defend Colombians who it believes to be victims of social, political, and economic injustices perpetrated by the Colombian government
leadership and organization: led by Eliecer Erlinto Chamorro (alt. Eliecer Herlinto Chamorro; aka "Antonio Garcia") since 2021; at the top of the organizational structure is the Central Command (“Comando Central” or COCE), which oversees all ELN political, military, financial, and international operations; under the COCE is a 23-member National Directorate that serves as the link between the COCE and the seven “War Fronts” (six regional and one urban-based front that operates in multiple large cities); each front has multiple subdivisions and subunits and operates with a significant degree of autonomy
areas of operation: operates mainly in the rural and mountainous areas of northern, northeastern, and southwestern Colombia, as well as the border regions with Venezuela; estimated to operate in at least 16 of Colombia's 32 departments, plus major cities, including Bogota; reportedly active in at least 8 of Venezuela's 23 states, particularly Amazonas, Apure, Bolivar, Guarico, Tachira, and Zulia
targets, tactics, and weapons: mostly attacks Colombia’s military forces, security services, and economic infrastructure, in particular oil and gas pipelines and electricity pylons; typical tactics include mortaring police stations and military bases, placing explosive devices on pipelines, electric pylons, and near roads, and engaging in sniper attacks, roadblocks, and ambushes; conducts numerous kidnappings of civilians and members of the security services; for three days in February 2022, orchestrated an armed strike across significant portions of Colombia (as many as 10 departments) that included violent attacks and targeted killings, blocking highways, setting off explosions, burning vehicles, hanging the ELN flag on public buildings, and patrolling streets in villages and towns in areas where the group maintains a strong presence; fighters are equipped with small arms, rocket-propelled grenades, landmines, explosives, and mortars
strength: estimated in 2023 to have up to 5,000 members
financial and other support: draws funding from the narcotics trade, extortion of oil and gas companies, illegal mining (expansion into Venezuela has included taking control of mines, allowing the group to use the acquisition of gold and diamond deposits to help provide funding), and kidnapping-for-ransom payments
designation: placed on the US Department of State's list of Foreign Terrorist Organizations on 8 October 1997
Palestine Islamic Jihad (PIJ)
aka: PIJ-Shaqaqi Faction; PIJ-Shallah Faction; Islamic Jihad of Palestine; Islamic Jihad in Palestine; Abu Ghunaym Squad of the Hizballah Bayt al-Maqdis; Al-Quds Squads; Al-Quds Brigades; Saraya al-Quds; Al-Awdah Brigades; Harakat al-Jihad al-Islami al-Filastin
history: formed by militant Palestinians in 1979 in Gaza; is the smaller of the two main Palestinian militant groups in Gaza, the other being the ruling HAMAS group with which it cooperates; unlike HAMAS, PIJ refuses to negotiate with Israel; since the 1980s, has conducted numerous attacks on Israel, including barrages of mortar and rocket strikes; continued active operations into 2023; it has partnered with the Hizballah terrorist group to carry out joint operations
goals: committed to the destruction of Israel and to the creation of an Islamic state in historic Palestine, an area that covers present-day Israel, Gaza, and the West Bank
leadership and organization: led by Ziyad al-NAKHALLAH and an eight-member leadership council (al-Maktab al-Am or General Bureau); has a 15-member political council, which represents PIJ members in Gaza, the West Bank, Israeli prisons, and abroad; also has an armed wing, known as the al-Quds (Jerusalem) Brigades, which has subordinate regional military commands, "brigades," or "battalions" that are comprised of cells and smaller units; in 2021-2022 reportedly had established several new "brigades" or "battalions" representing cities in the West Bank
areas of operation: Israel, the Gaza Strip, and the West Bank; some leaders and members reside in Lebanon, Syria, and throughout the Middle East
targets, tactics, and weapons: targets Israeli civilians and military personnel with bombings, small arms attacks on military patrols, and mortar and rocket attacks; most rocket attacks have struck southern Israel, but the group has developed longer-range versions capable of reaching further into Israel, including Tel Aviv; armed with small arms and light weapons, artillery rockets, man-portable air defense systems (MANPADs), mortars, armed unmanned aerial vehicles (aka drones), antitank guided missiles, rockets, and improvised explosive devices; the group in the past targeted Israel with suicide bombings and abductions
strength: estimated in 2022 to have about 1,000 members
financial and other support: receives financial assistance, military training, and weapons primarily from Iran; Hizballah provides safe harbor to PIJ leaders and representatives in Lebanon and probably facilitates Iran’s support to PIJ; trains with HAMAS; maintains a tunnel network to smuggle goods, arms, and ammunition across borders
designation: placed on the US Department of State's list of Foreign Terrorist Organizations on 8 October 1997
Palestine Liberation Front - Abu Abbas Faction
aka: PLF; PLF-Abu Abbas; Palestine Liberation Front
history: formed in the late 1970s as a splinter group from the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command; later split into pro-Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), pro-Syrian, and pro-Libyan factions; pro-PLO faction was led by Muhammad ZAYDAN (aka Abu ABBAS) and was based in Baghdad, Iraq, before the US invasion in 2003; ZAYDAN died in 2004 of natural causes while in US custody in Iraq; responsible for the 1985 attack on the Italian cruise ship Achille Lauro and the murder of a US citizen on board; suspected of supporting terrorism against Israel by other Palestinian groups into the 1990s, but the group was largely quiet until the 2008-10 timeframe, when it claimed responsibility for several attacks on Israeli civilians and military personnel; has not claimed any attacks since 2016, but reportedly maintains a presence in many refugee camps in Gaza, Lebanon, and Syria
goals: bolster its staging capabilities in Gaza against Israel and, ultimately, destroy the state of Israel in order to establish a secular, Marxist Palestinian state with Jerusalem as its capital
leadership and organization: led by Secretary General Dr. Wasil ABU YUSUF, a longtime member on the PLO’s executive committee
areas of operation: based in Gaza, where it maintains a recruitment and paramilitary training presence in most of the refugee camps; has members in Lebanon, Syria, and the West Bank
targets, tactics, and weapons: primarily targeted Israeli military and security personnel with occasional shootings and improvised explosive device attacks; weapons include small arms, artillery rockets, and explosives, including improvised explosive devices
strength: not available
financial and other support: not available
designation: placed on the US Department of State's list of Foreign Terrorist Organizations on 8 October 1997
Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine - General Command (PFLP-GC)
aka: PFLP-GC, Al-Jibha Sha'biya lil-Tahrir Filistin-al-Qadiya al-Ama, Ahmed Jibril Militia
history: a Marxist-Nationalist and secular group that split from the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) in 1968, claiming it wanted to concentrate more on resistance and less on politics; carried out dozens of attacks in Europe and the Middle East during the 1970s and 1980s, including bombings of two Western airliners; was also was known for cross-border terrorist attacks into Israel using unusual means, such as hot-air balloons and motorized hang gliders; since the early 1990s, has primarily focused on supporting Hizballah’s attacks against Israel, training members of other Palestinian terrorist groups, and smuggling weapons; between 2012 and 2015, claimed responsibility for several rocket attacks against Israel, as well as the bombing of a bus carrying civilians; has not claimed any attacks since 2015 but has fought alongside Syrian regime forces during the Syrian civil war until at least 2020; active as of 2023
goals: preserve Syrian President Bashar al-ASAD's regime; destroy the state of Israel and, ultimately, establish a secular, Marxist Palestinian state
leadership and organization: Talal NAJI (elected leader in July 2021 after the death of Ahmad JIBRIL, the group's leader and founder); overall organization not available, but has a military wing known as the Jihad Jibril Brigades
areas of operation: political leadership is headquartered in Damascus and many of the group’s members have fought in Syria since 2012; maintains bases in southern Lebanon and a presence in the Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon and Syria; maintains a small presence in Gaza; claimed that it launched rockets against Israel in 2021
targets, tactics, and weapons: contemporary targets are primarily paramilitary groups combatting Syrian regime forces; previously targeted Israeli military personnel and civilians with bombings and rocket attacks; fighters are armed with small arms, light machine guns, artillery rockets; rocket-propelled grenades, and explosives, including improvised explosive devices and suicide vests
strength: assessed in 2022 to have several hundred members
financial and other support: receives funds, logistical support, military training, and weapons from Iran and Syria, as well as the designated terrorist group Hizballah; garners payments in exchange for providing training to other armed groups, including HAMAS
designation: placed on the US Department of State's list of Foreign Terrorist Organizations on 8 October 1997
Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP)
aka: Halhul Gang; Halhul Squad; Palestinian Popular Resistance Forces; PPRF; Red Eagle Gang; Red Eagle Group; Red Eagles; Martyr Abu-Ali Mustafa Battalion
history: formed in December 1967 as an umbrella organization for Marxist and Arab nationalist groups after Israel seized the West Bank; became the second largest faction, and the main opposition force to Fatah, within the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO); earned a reputation for large-scale international attacks in the 1960s and 1970s, including high-profile hijackings of Israeli and Western aircraft; has been in decline since the 1980s following the collapse of the Soviet Union which had been its chief benefactor, and the emergence of non-PLO groups such as HAMAS and Palestine Islamic Jihad; since the 2000s, has focused its attacks on Israel and launched multiple joint operations with other Palestinian militant groups but its operational tempo has been low; since June 2017, only one attack has been attributed to the group; in September 2019, four members were arrested by Israeli security services for detonating an improvised explosive device that resulted in several Israeli casualties; in 2022, the PLFP, along with HAMAS and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, were attempting to take steps to create a National Liberation Front in an attempt to address divisions and to cooperate with and to rebuild the PLO; active in 2023
goals: destroy the state of Israel and, ultimately, establish a secular, Marxist Palestinian state with Jerusalem as its capital
leadership and organization: official leader, General Secretary Ahmad SA'DAT, has been serving a 30-year prison sentence in Israel since 2006; Deputy Secretary General 'Abd-al-Rahim MALLUH (var: Abdul Rahim MALLOUH) oversees daily operations; MALLUH is also a member of the PLO’s Executive Committee; has a Political Bureau and a military wing known as the Martyr Abu-Ali Mustafa Brigade
areas of operation: headquartered in the Gaza Strip; also operates in Israel, Lebanon, Syria, and the West Bank
targets, tactics, and weapons: since 2008, has claimed responsibility for numerous attacks on Israeli military forces in Gaza, as well as mortar shells and rockets fired from Gaza into Israel; members have been arrested by Israeli security forces for plotting to carry out kidnappings; in 2014, two members with axes, guns, and knives attacked a synagogue in West Jerusalem, killing five, including three Americans; in the early 2000s, the group carried out at least two suicide bombings and assassinated the Israeli Tourism Minister in retaliation for an Israeli airstrike that killed then PLFP leader Abu Ali Mustafa; fighters are equipped with small arms, light machine guns, artillery rockets, mortars, man-portable surface-to-air missiles, improvised weapons, and explosives, including improvised explosive devices and suicide vests
strength: not available
financial and other support: not available; historically received funds from the former Soviet Union and China; has claimed in draws support from Iran
designation: placed on the US Department of State's list of Foreign Terrorist Organizations on 8 October 1997
Real Irish Republican Army (RIRA)
aka: Real IRA; 32 County Sovereignty Committee; 32 County Sovereignty Movement; Irish Republican Prisoners Welfare Association; Real Oglaigh Na Heireann; Óglaigh na hÉireann (ÓNH); New Irish Republican Army (New IRA or NIRA)
established: formed in 1997 as the clandestine armed wing of the 32 County Sovereignty Movement, a political pressure group dedicated to removing British forces from Northern Ireland and unifying Ireland; claims to be the true descendent of the original Irish Republican Army; many members are former Provisional Irish Republican Army who left the organization after the group renewed its ceasefire in 1997 and brought extensive experience in terrorist tactics and bomb-making to RIRA; has historically sought to disrupt the Northern Ireland peace process and did not participate in the September 2005 weapons decommissioning; despite internal rifts and calls by some jailed members, including the group’s founder Michael “Mickey” McKEVITT, for a cease-fire and disbandment, RIRA has pledged to continue conducting attacks; in 2012, RIRA merged with other small dissident republican groups to form the New IRA; reportedly cooperates with the Continuity Irish Republican Army (CIRA); claimed responsibility for a bomb placed under a police officer's car in Belfast in June 2019, and Irish security forces arrested a number of New IRA members in 2020; remained active in 2022
goals: disrupt the Northern Ireland peace process, remove British rule in Northern Ireland and, ultimately, unify Ireland
leadership and organization: current leadership not available; reportedly has a command structure similar to the former Provisional IRA, with an “Army Council” consisting of a chief of staff and directors for training, operations, finance, and publicity; rank-and-file members operate in covert cells
areas of operation: United Kingdom and the Republic of Ireland
targets, tactics, and weapons: primarily targets British security forces and police officers in Northern Ireland, as well as civilians; tactics typically involve shootings and low-impact bombing attacks; weapons include small arms, mortars, and explosives, including improvised explosive devices and car bombs
strength: estimated in 2021 to have approximately 100 active members; may receive limited support from IRA hardliners and sympathizers who are dissatisfied with the IRA’s ceasefire and with Sinn Fein’s involvement in the peace process
financial and other support: receives funding from money laundering, smuggling, and other criminal activities; suspected of receiving funds from sympathizers in the US; has attempted to buy weapons from gun dealers in the US and the Balkans
designation: placed on the US Department of State's list of Foreign Terrorist Organizations on 16 May 2001
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia - People’s Army (FARC-EP)
aka: Ejercito del Pueblo; FARC dissidents FARC - EP ; Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia dissidents FARC - EP; FARC - D/FARC - EP; Grupo Armado Organizado Residual FARC - EP; GAO-R FARC - EP; Residual Organized Armed Group FARC - EP; Central General Staff (Estado Mayor Central or EMC)
history: in 2016, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) signed a peace deal in which about 13,000 fighters gave up their weapons in exchange for numerous concessions from the Colombian Government, including development programs for rural areas and the opportunity for former guerrilla leaders to participate in local politics and avoid time in prison; however, a group of approximately 1,000 FARC “dissidents,” led by Nestor Gregorio VERA Fernandez, commander of the FARC 1st Front, refused to lay down their arms; the group returned to fighting and eventually adopted the name FARC-EP; in late 2019, the Colombian Government began conducting military operations against FARC-EP, which continued into 2023; the FARC-EP in 2023 was in conflict with another rival FARC dissident group and US-designated Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO), Segunda Marquetalia, over control of revenue and territory
goals: the former FARC sought to install a Marxist-Leninist regime in Colombia through a violent revolution; the group seeks to unite all FARC dissidents and leftist guerrilla groups in Colombia
leadership and organization - leader Nestor Gregorio VERA Fernandez (aka Ivan MORDISCO); reportedly organized similarly to the former FARC with regionally based commands and subordinate “fronts” or “blocs” and “mobile columns,” although some information points to a more fragmented command and control structure based in large part on alliances with disparate ex-FARC members and groups, as well as criminal organizations
areas of operation: operates primarily in southern and northeastern Colombia and has a presence in Venezuela (particularly Apure state); it also maintains alliances with ex-FARC individuals and groups in other parts of Colombia, particularly along narco-trafficking routes and areas that generate revenue; ex-FARC groups operate in many of the departments where the FARC previously operated, including along the borders with Venezuela, Brazil, and Ecuador
targets, tactics, and weapons: responsible for the vast majority of the armed attacks attributed to FARC dissident elements since 2019; FARC-EP has also been responsible for the killing of political candidates and former FARC members, the kidnapping of a political operative, and attempted assassinations of a department governor; the former FARC targeted Colombian political, military, and economic figures, as well as pro-government paramilitary groups and economic targets, such as oil pipelines; was responsible for large numbers of kidnappings-for-ransoms, including foreign citizens; combined guerrilla-style and terrorist tactics, including ambushes, complex ground assaults, grenade and mortar attacks, assassinations, kidnappings, and bombings; weapons included small arms, light and heavy machine guns, landmines, mortars, grenades, small rockets, and explosives, including improvised explosive devices
strength: unclear; estimates in 2022 were as high as 5,000 total FARC dissidents, including approximately 2,000-2,500 active and another 2,000-2,500 part-time supporters
financial and other support: generate funds through narcotics trafficking, extortion, illegal mining (typically gold), and other illicit economies; collects taxes from locals in areas it occupies
designation - placed on the US Department of State's list of Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTO) on 30 November 2021; the designation followed the revocation of the designation of the Revolutionary Forces of Colombia (FARC) as an FTO; note: the former FARC has a political party (Comunes or “together”) that holds seats in the Colombian Congress
Revolutionary People's Liberation Party/Front (DHKP/C)
aka: Dev Sol; Dev Sol Armed Revolutionary Units; Dev Sol Silahli Devrimci Birlikleri; Dev Sol SDB; Devrimci Halk Kurtulus Partisi/Cephesi; Devrimci Sol; Revolutionary Left
history: formed in Turkey originally in 1978 as Devrimci Sol, or Dev Sol, a splinter faction of Dev Genc (Revolutionary Youth); renamed in 1994 after factional infighting; “Party” refers to the group’s political activities and “Front” alludes to its militant operations; advocates a Marxist-Leninist ideology and opposes the US, NATO, and the Turkish establishment; reorganized after the death of its founder and leader Dursun KARATAS from cancer in 2008 and was reportedly in competition with the Kurdistan Workers’ Party for influence in Turkey; since the late 1980s has primarily targeted Turkish security and military officials; in the 1990s began to conduct attacks against foreign—including US—interests; activities have declined in recent years, but the group remained active and continued to be targeted by Turkish security forces into 2023
goals: strives to establish a socialist state and to abolish Turkish prisons
leadership and organization: current leadership not available; head of DHKP/C in Turkey, Gulten Matur, arrested by Turkish authorities in November 2022; reportedly operates in small, clandestine cells
areas of operation: located in Turkey, primarily in Adana, Ankara, Istanbul, and Izmir; has an active presence in Europe, especially in areas with large Turkish diaspora communities
targets, tactics, and weapons: responsible for killing dozens of current and retired Turkish senior officials, police officers, soldiers, businessmen, and other civilians since its inception; launched rocket attacks on police and government buildings, including a rocket attack against the Istanbul police headquarters in 2017; has targeted foreign interests, especially US military and diplomatic personnel and facilities, such as a suicide bombing attack against the US Embassy in 2013; typical tactics include assassinations, hostage taking, rocket attacks, suicide bombings, remotely detonated bombs, and car bombs; weapons include small arms, hand grenades, artillery rockets, and explosives, including improvised explosive devices, suicide vests, and car bombs
strength: numbers inside Turkey not available; has a support network in Europe
financial and other support: finances its activities chiefly through donations and extortion; in Europe, it engages in fundraising, arms smuggling, and other criminal ventures to support its operations in Turkey
designation: placed on the US Department of State's list of Foreign Terrorist Organizations on 8 October 1997
Revolutionary Struggle (RS)
aka: Epanastatikos Aghonas; EA
history: RS is a Marxist extremist group that emerged in 2003 following the arrests of members of two other Greek Marxist groups, 17 November (17N) and Revolutionary People’s Struggle; first gained notoriety when it claimed responsibility for the September 2003 bombings at the Athens Courthouse during the trials of 17N members; has since conducted numerous attacks against Greek and US targets in Greece; largely inactive since the 2017 arrest of its last known leader and assessed to be largely defunct
goals: disrupt the influence of globalization and international capitalism on Greek society and, ultimately, overthrow the Greek Government
leadership and organization: not available; former leader Panagiota ROUPA (aka Pola ROUPA) was Greece's most wanted terrorist until she was taken into Greek custody in January 2017 and later sentenced to 25 years imprisonment; organizational information not available
areas of operation: operated exclusively inside Greece, primarily in Athens
targets, tactics, and weapons: targeted Greek Government officials and buildings and officials' residences, multinational firms, domestic and foreign financial institutes, and embassies and diplomats; modeled its modus operandi on past 17N attacks, incorporating high-profile assassination attempts, armed raids, bank robberies, car bombings, and rocket attacks; used small arms and light weapons, rocket-propelled grenades, and explosives, including improvised explosive devices and car bombs
strength: estimated to have fewer than two dozen members in 2022
financial and other support: unclear, but most likely supported itself through criminal activities, including bank robberies
designation: placed on the US Department of State's list of Foreign Terrorist Organizations on 18 May 2009
Segunda Marquetaliaaka
aka: New Marquetalia; Second Marquetalia; La Nueva Marquetalia; FARC dissidents Segunda Marquetalia; Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia Dissidents Segunda Marquetalia; FARC-D Segunda Marquetalia; FARC-SM; Grupo Armado Organizado Residual Segunda Marquetalia; GAO-R Segunda Marquetalia;, Residual Organized Armed Group Segunda Marquetalia; Armed Organized Residual Group Segunda Marquetalia; note - "Marquetalia" is a reference to the town of Marquetalia, Colombia, that was the original stronghold of communist peasant militants who would later become the now former FARC
history: created in August 2019 by former commanders of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) after they abandoned the 2016 peace accord between the FARC and the Colombian Government because of frustration over perceived lack of progress in implementing the terms of the accord; attempts to carry out the key functions of the state in the areas under its control, including taxation, security, and maintaining infrastructure; as of 2023, the Colombian Government was conducting military operations against the group, and it was in conflict with the rival FARC dissident group, FARC-People's Army (FARC-EP), over control of revenue and territory; has sought negotiations with the Colombian Government
goals: position itself as the natural successor of the former FARC and unite different groups that claim FARC heritage; the former FARC sought to install a Marxist-Leninist regime in Colombia through a violent revolution; the group seeks to unite or form alliances with armed leftist guerrilla organizations in Colombia, including ex-FARC members, the ELN (National Liberation Army), and the smaller EPL (People's Liberation Army)
leadership and organization - Luciano Marin ARANGO (aka Ivan MARQUEZ) (note - ARANGO was previously the FARC’s second-in-command before demobilization, commander of the Caribbean bloc, and lead negotiator during the peace talks with the Colombian Government); has a central committee (aka central command), known as the National Directorate; claims to consist of a political wing (Partido Comunista Clandestino de Colombia or Clandestine Communist Party), as well as armed guerrilla forces and both armed and unarmed militia units; similar to the former FARC, it operates in “blocs” and “fronts”
areas of operation: operates primarily in northern Colombia in former zones of control under ARANGO, including the Serranía del Perijá mountain range and the departments of La Guajira, Cesar, and Arauca, as well as in the state of Apure in Venezuela
targets, tactics, and weapons: is responsible for the killings of former FARC members and community leaders; has engaged in assassinations, hostage-taking, including the kidnapping and holding for ransom of government employees, and attempted killings of political leaders; the former FARC traditionally targeted Colombian political, military, and economic figures, as well as pro-government paramilitary groups and economic targets, such as oil pipelines; was responsible for large numbers of kidnappings-for-ransoms, including foreign citizens; combined guerrilla-style and terrorist tactics, including ambushes, complex ground assaults, grenade and mortar attacks, assassinations, kidnappings, and bombings; weapons included small arms, light and heavy machine guns, landmines, mortars, grenades, and explosives, including improvised explosive devices
strength: estimates in 2022 were as high as 5,000 total FARC dissidents, including approximately 2,000-2,500 active and another 2,000-2,500 part-time supporters
financial and other support: reportedly generates funds through narcotics trafficking, extortion, illegal mining (typically gold), and other illicit economies; collects taxes from locals in areas it occupies
designation - placed on the US Department of State's list of Foreign Terrorist Organizations on 30 November 2021; the designation followed the revocation of the designation of the Revolutionary Forces of Colombia (FARC) as an FTO; note: the former FARC has a political party (Comunes or "together") that holds seats in the Colombian Congress
Shining Path (Sendero Luminoso, SL)
aka: Ejército Guerrillero Popular (People’s Guerrilla Army); EGP; Ejército Popular de Liberación (People’s Liberation Army); EPL; Partido Comunista del Peru (Communist Party of Peru); PCP; Partido Comunista del Peru en el Sendero Luminoso de Jose Carlos Mariategui (Communist Party of Peru on the Shining Path of Jose Carlos Mariategui); Socorro Popular del Peru (People’s Aid of Peru); SPP; Militarizado Partido Comunista del Peru; MPCP; Militarized Communist Party of Peru; New Red Fraction (Nueva Fracción Roja: NFR; splinter group)
history: formed in the late 1960s as a breakaway faction of the Peruvian Communist Party by former university professor Abimael GUZMAN, whose teachings provided the basis of the group’s militant Maoist doctrine; was one of the most ruthless terrorist groups in the Western Hemisphere at its height in the 1980s; conducted an insurgency against the Peruvian Government and waged a campaign of violence on civilians, particularly the rural peasantry; the conflict resulted in the deaths of an estimated 70,000 Peruvians between 1980 and 2000; in September 1992, Peruvian authorities captured GUZMAN, who died in prison in 2021; following his capture, membership declined and the remnants split into two factions; by 2014, one faction had largely been eliminated, while the other continued to operate; the group continues to try to reinvent itself, organize, and proselytize, particularly amongst university students and in rural areas, although most of its operations were in support of narcotrafficking; in recent years has called itself Militarizado Partido Comunista del Peru (the Militarized Communist Party of Peru); Peruvian security forces continued to conduct operations against remnants of the group in 2023
goals: generate revenue by providing security to narcotics traffickers and by growing coca to produce cocaine; historically aimed to replace existing Peruvian institutions with a peasant revolutionary regime
leadership and organization: Victor Quispe PALOMINO (aka Comrade Jose); organization not available
areas of operation: Peru; most active in the Valley of the Apurimac, Ene, and Mantaro Rivers (VRAEM), a vast jungle area near the Andes mountains and home to most of Peru's coca cultivation and production
targets, tactics, and weapons: primary targets in recent years have been Peruvian soldiers and police personnel running counter-narcotics and counter-terrorism operations against the group; also abducts and kills civilians; killed 16 civilians in an attack on a village as late as May 2021; typically uses guerrilla style hit-and-run tactics, including grenade attacks and snipers with long-range rifles; weapons include small arms and other light weapons, grenades, and other explosives, including improvised explosive devices
strength: estimated in 2023 to have less than 350 active members
financial resources: primarily funded by the illicit narcotics trade
designation: placed on the US Department of State's list of Foreign Terrorist Organizations on 8 October 1997
Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP)
aka: Pakistani Taliban; Tehreek-e-Taliban; Tehrik-e-Taliban; Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan
history: formed in 2007 to oppose Pakistani military efforts in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA); previously disparate tribal militants agreed to cooperate and eventually coalesced under the leadership of now-deceased leader Baitullah MEHSUD (var. MAHSUD); emerged as one of Pakistan's deadliest terrorist organizations; responsible for assaults on a Pakistani naval base in 2011, Karachi's international airport in 2014, and a military school in Peshawar that killed 150 people, mostly students, also in 2014; entered into peace talks with the Pakistani Government in 2014, but talks collapsed that same year; beginning around 2014, the group suffered from several years of internal conflict, fragmentation, public backlash for deadly attacks targeting civilians, and members defecting to ISIS's Khorasan branch in Afghanistan; however, in 2020-2022, the group demonstrated signs of resurgence, with more than 15 jihadist groups, including Jamat-ul-Ahrar (JuA), Hizb-ul-Ahrar (HuA), and the designated FTO Lashkar I Jhangvi (LJ), pledging allegiance to TTP; JuA and HuA had split off from TTP around 2014; in addition, the group increased the number of cross-border attacks from Afghanistan into Pakistan; in March 2022, TTP announced that it was launching a spring "offensive" of attacks against Pakistani security services; TTP has ties to and draws ideological guidance from al-Qa’ida (AQ), while elements of AQ have relied in part on TTP for safe haven in the Pashtun areas along the Afghanistan-Pakistani border; the group has conducted peace talks with the Pakistan Government accompanied by brief cease-fires in 2021 and 2022; conducted more than 100 attacks in 2022 and continued conducting operations in 2023, including multiple attacks on Pakistani police targets in urban areas, as well as a suicide bombing on a mosque in Peshawar that killed at least 100 people, mostly police
goals: unite all the jihadist groups in Pakistan under one banner; push the Pakistani Government out of Khyber Pakhtunkwa Province (formerly known as the Federally Administered Tribal Areas) and establish strict Islamic law; ultimately, establish an Islamic caliphate over all of Pakistan
leadership and organization: led by Mufti Noor Wali MEHSUD (aka Abu Mansur Asim); has a shura council with two regional committees covering seven zones of operation; however, because TTP is a coalition of more than 15 groups, as well as tribal factions, operational levels of cooperation may vary
areas of operation: Afghanistan and Pakistan, particularly the tribal belt along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border, Kunar and Paktika Provinces in Afghanistan, and the Pakistani regions of North Waziristan, South Waziristan, and Balochistan
targets, tactics, and weapons: targets Pakistani Government officials and military, security, and police personnel, as well as pro-government tribal elders, Shia Muslims, educational figures, and Westerners; previously targeted US military personnel in Afghanistan; claimed responsibility for a failed 2010 attempt to detonate an explosive device in New York City's Times Square; suspected of involvement in the 2007 assassination of former Pakistani Prime Minister Benazir BHUTTO; has attacked an airport, buses, churches, government buildings, homes of Pakistani officials, markets, hotels, military bases and convoys, mosques, public gatherings, schools, security checkpoints, and entire neighborhoods of Shia Muslims; was heavily criticized for indiscriminate attacks on civilians, including attacks on an election campaign gathering in 2018 that killed more than 20 and an assault on a school in 2014 that killed 150, including 130 school children; however, after MEHSUD took command in 2018, the group reportedly issued new targeting guidelines restricting attacks on civilians; tactics typically have involved ambushes, hit-and-run raids, small arms attacks, complex military-style assaults, kidnappings, assassinations, suicide bombings, and grenade, mortar, and rocket attacks; weapons include small arms, light and heavy machine guns, mortars, and explosives, including remotely detonated improvised explosive devices, suicide vests, and car bombs
strength: assessed in 2022 to have as many as 6,000 fighters
financial and other support: primarily recruits from the former FATA and finances its operations through donations, extortion, kidnappings-for-ransom, natural resource extraction, and other criminal activity, including arms and narcotics trafficking
designation: placed on the US Department of State's list of Foreign Terrorist Organizations on 1 September 2010